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Abstract 
What explains rising partisan animosity in the United States? We argue that mass partisans’ feelings 
toward the social group coalitions of the parties are an important cause of rising affective 
polarization. We first leverage evidence from the ANES Time Series to show that partisans’ 
feelings toward the social groups linked to their in-party (out-party) have grown more positive 
(negative) over time. We then turn to the 1992-1996 and 2000-2004 ANES Panel surveys to 
disentangle the inter-relationship between partisan polarization and social group evaluations. 
Individuals with more polarized social group evaluations in 1992 or 2000 report substantially more 
polarized party thermometer ratings and more extreme, and better sorted, partisan identities four 
years later. Notably, these variables exerted little reciprocal influence on group evaluations. Our 
study has important implications for understanding affective polarization and the role of social 
groups in public opinion. 
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Mass partisans in the United States increasingly dislike the other side, a phenomenon called 
partisan affective polarization (Abramowitz and Webster 2016; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). A 
leading explanation for this growing polarization points less to the role of ideology and more to the 
increasing group distinctiveness of the parties and concomitant identity-based motivations to 
impugn the other side (Ahler and Sood n.d.; Mason 2015, 2016). Broadly, this perspective calls 
attention to the increasing social homogeneity of the parties due to changes in the voting behavior 
of racial, geographic, gender, and religious groups (Achen and Bartels 2016; Layman 2001; Zingher 
2014). Better-sorted social groups may mean that partisans are less able to see themselves, and their 
kind of people, in the other side thereby leading to greater social distance between these group 
coalitions and ultimately enhanced animosity.  
We take up this argument and address a key empirical limitation facing existing work. 
While this group-oriented explanation for affective polarization calls attention to changing 
evaluations of group/party relationships, e.g. a growing association between the out-party and 
disliked groups, existing work has not examined whether these evaluations have actually changed 
over time. However, without this analysis we cannot truly know whether beliefs about social groups 
are a cause of the overtime change in partisan affective polarization. We leverage ANES Time 
Series and Panel data to address two questions: (1) have partisans’ attitudes toward the social 
groups linked to the parties also polarized over time and (2) is any such social group polarization 
associated with higher levels of partisan affective polarization? We find that partisans’ have indeed 
grown to increasingly like (dislike) the groups associated with their in-party (out-party). In addition, 
polarization in these group evaluations is substantially related to later levels of partisan affective 
polarization, party identity extremity, and party/ideological sorting. Our study thus builds on, and 
contributes to, existing work connecting social groups to partisan affect and identity by exploring a 
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broader array of social groups over a longer period and thus provides novel evidence for the group 
bases of partisan affective polarization and ultimately partisan conflict.  
Study 1: Social Group Polarization Over Time 
We turn to evidence from the American National Election Study (ANES) Time Series to 
investigate partisans’ evaluations of the parties’ social group coalitions. To do so we fit a 
confirmatory factor analysis on the social group feeling thermometers contained on each 
Presidential year ANES survey from 1980-2016.1 This method has the advantages of enabling a 
correction for systematic differences in the use of the thermometer scale by respondents and also 
enables the groups to differentially contribute to the calculation of a respondent’s latent evaluation 
of the parties’ group coalitions (Weisberg, Haynes, and Krosnick 1995; Wilcox and Cook 1989).  
In each survey-year we began by fitting a two-factor model on which all social group feeling 
thermometers (including those for the two parties) were included: a ‘substantive’ dimension and a 
‘measurement’ dimension on which the thermometers were constrained to load equally and which 
was constrained to be uncorrelated with the ‘substantive’ dimension. This second dimension 
captures the aforementioned individual differences in thermometer use by respondents. How the 
groups loaded on the ‘substantive’ dimension affected how we treated them in the ensuing three-
dimension (Democratic Groups, Republican Groups, and Measurement) model. Those groups that 
loaded in the same direction as the Democratic Party were sorted into a “Democratic Groups” factor 
in the ensuing model while those loading in the opposite direction were sorted into the “Republican 
Groups” factor. Common ‘Democratic’ groups included ‘liberals,’ ‘Feminists’, ‘unions,’ 
‘environmentalists,’ and ‘Blacks’, while common ‘Republican’ groups included ‘conservatives’, 
                                                          
1 We focus on this period because it captures the period of growing partisan affective polarization (Iyengar et al. 2012). 
In addition, affect toward the Democratic and Republican parties is not asked until 1980; before then, the ANES asked 
about “Democrats” and “Republicans” which may elicit slightly different reactions among respondents.   
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‘big business’, ‘Christian fundamentalists’, and the ‘military’. It should be noted that we omitted the 
Democratic and Republican party thermometer items in this second three-factor model so that the 
ensuing factor scores capture affect specifically regarding the social groups linked to the parties and 
not the parties themselves. Online Appendix A provides the model results for these models.2  
In Figure 1 we plot the predicted evaluations of the Democratic and Republican group 
coalitions from these models with separate sub-graphs for Democratic and Republican respondents. 
Figure 1 also plots the difference between in-group (e.g. Democrats’ evaluations of Democratic 
groups) and out-group evaluations (e.g. Democrats’ evaluations of Republican groups). Figure 1 
shows that partisans evaluated in-party associated groups more positively than out-party associated 
groups in all survey-years. These ratings, moreover, have diverged over time with a jump in 
polarization from the 1980s to the 1990s and then again in 2012; this is notably similar to the time 
trends in partisan antipathy shown in Iyengar and Krupenkin (2018). However, Figure 1 also shows 
some slight differences by respondent partisanship and target. For instance, Republicans’ 
evaluations of their party’s group coalition became only slightly more positive between 1980 and 
2008 before a jump in 2012. On the other hand, Republicans grew substantially more negative in 
their evaluations of Democratic-aligned groups during this period save 2008. Democratic 
respondents show an inverse pattern: slightly growing positive affect toward in-party aligned groups 
before a recent acceleration, but more consistency in their evaluations of Republican-aligned groups 
                                                          
2 Some additional points. First, we recoded missing data to a score of 50 to maximize the data available to us. Second, 
the 2012/2016 results focus on non-online sample respondents; Online Appendix A shows that this leads to lower levels 
of group polarization in 2012 than would otherwise occur. Second, items would occasionally load negatively on their 
assigned dimension in the 3-factor model implying that the group did not belong on this dimension. In these cases the 
group was removed (or constrained to load at 0) from the group dimension in question such that it would no longer 
contribute to the estimation of the latent evaluation. We investigate a variety of alternative specifications for these 
models the Online Appendices with broadly similar results emerging (in particular, Appendices C, E, F, and G).  
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before 2012. Figure 1 thus demonstrates evidence in favor of increasing social group polarization 
over time akin to the partisan affective polarization observed in other studies. 
Study 2: Panel Evidence 
In the preceding section we found evidence of increasing social group polarization; partisans 
evaluate in-party aligned groups more positively than out-party aligned groups and this gap has 
increased over time. We turn to data from the 1992-1994-1996 and 2000-2002-2004 ANES Panel 
Surveys to investigate the inter-relationship between social group polarization and partisan affective 
polarization. The use of panel data here is crucial as it enables us to untangle the potentially 
reciprocal relationship between these concepts. However, panel data are no panacea for causal 
inference with observational data particularly insofar as omitted variables cause changes in both our 
independent and dependent variables (Finkel 2008; Gerber, Huber, and Washington 2010). 
For both panels we estimated Social Group Polarization in the same manner as we did in 
the Time Series analyses. For all three waves of each panel survey we fit a three-factor model on 
the social group thermometers in the same manner discussed above and predicted each respondent’s 
factor score from the model. We then sorted these scores along partisan lines to produce partisan in-
group and out-group evaluations much as we did earlier. We finally subtracted out-group 
evaluations from in-group evaluations to obtain our measure of social group polarization. We 
rescaled this variable to fall on a 0-1 scale where increasing values indicate a growing bias toward 
in-groups relative to out-groups.  
We will investigate three variables related to partisan affective polarization due to 
unevenness in the variables available across the two panels. First, we use data from the 1992-1994-
1996 Panel to look at Partisan Affective Polarization, i.e. the difference between a respondent’s 
thermometer rating of their in-party and out-party. Higher scores on this variable indicate greater in-
party bias (scale:0-1). Unfortunately, this variable is only available in this particular Panel so we 
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will also explore two variables theoretically and substantively related to partisan affective 
polarization. We investigate Party Identity Extremity using data from both panel surveys. More 
extreme partisan identities are associated with a greater degree of partisan affective polarization 
(Mason 2015). As we are interested in the changing reactions of partisans, identity extremity ranges 
from leaning partisan (=0) to strong partisan (=1) in the first year of the panel (i.e. 1992) and from 
Independent (=0) to strong partisan (=1) in subsequent years. This accounts for the possibility that 
some partisans in 1992/2000 may identify as an Independent in the later waves. Finally, we will 
examine Partisan-Ideological Sorting in both the 1992-1994-1996 and 2000-2002 ANES Panels. 
Sorted partisans also report more partisan affective polarization (Mason 2015); if social group 
polarization predicts sorting, then it should also be related to partisan affective polarization as well. 
It is also plausible that social group polarization will predict sorting given that ideological self-
placements are also predicated upon social group evaluations (Zschirnt 2011). We measure 
partisan-ideological sorting in a manner following Mason (2015). Specifically, a respondent’s 
sorting score is formulated by taking the absolute value of their 7-point party identification and 7-
point (reverse coded) ideology scores and then multiplying this difference by both partisan identity 
and ideological strength.3 We then re-scaled this variable to range from 0-1 with higher scores 
indicating greater identity alignment. 
We estimate the reciprocal relationship between social group polarization and these three 
variables via cross-lagged panel models (Finkel 2008).4 For instance, we regress time t values of 
partisan affective polarization on its t-1 values as well as t-1 values for social group polarization. 
                                                          
3 In other words, Sorting = |PID – Ideology|*PID Extremity*Ideological Extremity.   
4 We investigate alternative specifications in Online Appendix B. We first show results from cross-lagged OLS models 
for each wave dyad (i.e. 92-94, 94-96, and 92-96). We then explore fixed-effect panel models that enable us to control 
for unobserved time invariant variables (Finkel 2008). These specifications yield substantially similar results.  
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Likewise, time t values for social group polarization are regressed on its t-1 values as well as t-1 
values for partisan affective polarization. We estimate both models simultaneously for each year 
dyad (i.e. 1992->1994 and 1994->1996) using a structural equation modeling estimator (Finkel 
2008). Because we control for lagged values of the dependent variable we can thus assess whether 
prior social group polarization is associated with changes in subsequent levels of partisan affective 
polarization, etc., and vice versa. Moreover, we can test for whether the relationship between prior 
social group polarization and later partisan affective polarization, etc., is equivalent to, or 
alternatively greater/lesser than, the inverse pathway. We include a series of control variables 
measured in the first wave of the panel survey: age, education, race, gender, political interest, racial 
resentment, ideological extremity (in the non-sorting analyses), and issue extremity.  
 Table 1 provides an overview of the relationship between social group polarization 
and our three affective polarization related variables; we provide full model results in Online 
Appendix B. If the group based account of partisan affective polarization is accurate than we should 
see a positive relationship between social group polarization and the three “Party” even while 
controlling for prior values of the dependent variable. And, indeed, Table 1 shows that social group 
polarization measured in year t has a significant and substantive relationship with subsequent levels 
of party affective polarization, PID strength, and party/ideological sorting in all models save for the 
2000-2002 model of PID strength. Moving from minimum to maximum levels of social group 
polarization in year t is associated with 16-25% more partisan polarization, 8 to 21% more extreme 
partisan identities, and 12-38% higher scores on the sorting variable in year t+1. On the other hand, 
the three party polarization-related variables have a much more inconsistent relationship with later 
social group polarization and one that is generally substantially smaller in scope. Indeed, as the 
Wald tests at the bottom of Table 1 attest, the pathway from social group polarization to these party 
variables is nearly always significantly greater than the inverse pathway. Table 1 lends novel and 
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substantive support to the claim that social group evaluations lead, rather than follow, party 
affective polarization and associated variables.  
Conclusion 
 We have explored an untested implication of group-based theories of partisan 
affective polarization, and of party conflict more generally: that partisans’ evaluations of the 
parties’ social group coalitions have polarized over time and that these evaluations are related to 
subsequent levels of partisan affective polarization. In the former case, we saw evidence that the 
polarization that has emerged along partisan lines also extends to evaluations of these social group 
coalitions. In the latter case, we saw consistent evidence that social group polarization is a driving 
force behind increased partisan affective polarization rather than vice versa. We thus provide novel 
and substantial evidence in favor of the group interpretation of partisan affective polarization.  
 There exist several notable paths that future research could take to expand upon our 
results. First, a similar methodology as used here could be exploited to explore the origins of 
partisan identification itself and its roots in group evaluations. Second, the role of partisan elites in 
this process deserves special attention. Elites may matter in two non-exclusive ways. First, the 
demographic composition of party elites provide signals concerning the types of groups at home in 
a partisan coalition (e.g., Evans and Tilley 2017). Party elites may thus serve as a heuristic enabling 
voters to ascertain changes in the party’s group coalitions. Second, elites appeal to social groups in 
society via rhetoric and also use rhetoric designed to prime group considerations (e.g., Valentino 
and Neuner n.d.). This raises an important question for further research: what role does such 
rhetoric play in the development of both social group and partisan affective polarization?  
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Figure 1: Democratic and Republican Respondents’ Evaluations of Partisan Group Coalitions 
 
Notes: The first two subgraphs provide the predicted factor score for Democratic Party and 
Republican aligned groups (with 95% confidence intervals) separately for Democratic and then 
Republican respondents. For the final graph we sorted these scores into in-groups (i.e. evaluations 
of Democratic Groups by Democrats), out-groups (i.e. evaluations of Democratic Groups by 
Republicans) for each respondent and took the difference; positive scores thus indicate a positive 
bias in favor of in-party related groups. The bandwidth for the lowess regression line is 0.8. Figure 
schemes courtesy of Bischof (2017). 
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Table 1: The Reciprocal Relationship Between Social Group Polarization & Party Affective 
Polarization, PID Strength, and Party/Ideological Sorting 
 1992-1994-1996; “Party” =   2000-2002-2004; “Party” =   
 Party 
Polarization 
PID Strength Sorting PID Strength Sorting 
Cross-Lag 
Coefficient 
     
T1 SGP -> 
T2 Party 
0.161** 
(0.0417) 
0.212* 
(0.0833) 
0.378** 
(0.0677) 
0.0795 
(0.0715) 
0.280** 
(0.0575) 
      
T2 SGP -> 
T3 Party 
0.251** 
(0.0659) 
0.195* 
(0.0908) 
0.309** 
(0.0730) 
0.124* 
(0.0616) 
N/A 
      
T1 Party -> 
T2 SGP 
0.0504+ 
(0.0290) 
0.00394 
(0.0113) 
0.0847** 
(0.0225) 
0.0343** 
(0.0115) 
0.117** 
(0.0159) 
      
T2 Party -> 
T3 SGP  
0.118* 
(0.0490) 
0.0273 
(0.0206) 
0.100** 
(0.0283) 
-0.00602 
(0.0184) 
N/A 
      
N =  425 425 425 621 831 
      
Wald Tests      
(SGPt1 -> 
Partyt2) = 
(Partyt1 -> 
(SGPt2) 
p < 0.05 p < 0.10 p < 0.01 p = 0.53 p < 0.01 
      
(SGPt2 -> 
Partyt3) = 
(Partyt2 -> 
(SGPt3) 
p = 0.119 p < 0.05 p < 0.01 p < 0.05 N/A 
 
Notes: Each column provides the results from a different model differentiated by which party 
variable is involved. Cell entries provide the unstandardized coefficients for the Party variables 
(Party Polarization, PID Strength, and Partisan/Ideological Sorting) and for Social Group 
Polarization (SGP). T1 = 1992 or 2000; T2 = 1994 or 2002; T3 = 1996 or 2004. The Cross-Lagged 
coefficients show the reciprocal influence of these variables on each other after controlling for the 
lagged values of the DV. The Wald tests test whether we can reject the null that the Partyt-1 -> SGPt 
path is equivalent to the SGPt-1 -> Partyt path. Full model results, including estimates for control 
variables and stability coefficients, can be found in Online Appendix B. ; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** 
p < 0.01 
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The Group Basis of Partisan Affective Polarization 
 
Online Appendices 
 
1. Appendix A: ANES Times Series Results/Analyses 
2. Appendix B: ANES Panel Analyses – Models for Analyses in Text, SUREG Results, and 
Fixed Effect Regression Models 
3. Appendix C: Replication of Results with ‘Common’ Items Only 
4. Appendix D: Replication of Results while Accounting for Group ‘Closeness’ 
5. Appendix E: Replication of Results while Omitting Racial Groups from Group Dimensions 
6. Appendix F: Replication of Results while Omitting ‘Liberals’ and ‘Conservatives’ from 
Group Dimensions 
7. Appendix G: Free vs. Fixed Thermometer Loading Results   
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Appendix A 
 
 In this Appendix we provide the results from our ANES Time Series confirmatory factor 
analyses.  
Figure OA1 provides a different way of showing the level of group polarization over time; the left 
hand sub-graph in this figure shows the mean rating given to ‘in-groups’ and ‘out-groups’ while the right 
hand sub-graph explicitly focuses on its difference.  
Table OA1, meanwhile, provides a comparison of results between models conducted on the full 
sample of the 2012 and 2016 ANES Time Series with models based on just those that completed the survey 
with an interviewer present. These latter analyses are the ones reported in text. We focus on the FTF only 
sample in-text to maintain comparability across the Time Series waves. As Homola, Jackson, and Gill (2016) 
have shown, for instance, feeling thermometer ratings on the ANES 2012 Time Series yield more variable or 
extreme patterns of responses than the face-to-face ratings. Table A1 shows this in effect albeit only for 
Democratic respondents. An analysis of the full sample would thus reveal even higher levels of group 
polarization in 2012. Notably, the exclusion of the online sample does not materially influence the 
predicted evaluations in 2016, suggesting that mode had a reduced influence in this year.  
Figure OA2 further delves into the TS analyses by presenting the mean ratings of the social group 
coalitions by Independents. If partisanship and associated party evaluations are driven by evaluations of 
party-group images (e.g., Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004), then one plausible supposition would be 
that Independents are individuals with more muted evaluations of the party’s group coalitions perhaps due 
to cross-pressures (e.g. positive evaluations of some groups associated with Party X and negative 
evaluations of other groups associated with Party X). Figure OA2 is consistent with this supposition; 
evaluations of the group coalitions among Independents hover around 0 with overlapping confidence 
intervals.  
Tables OA2 to OA11, meanwhile, provide the factor loadings from the CFA analyses.  
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Figure OA1: Social Group Polarization Over Time 
 
 
Notes: The left-handed sub-graph provides the mean score for evaluations of party in-groups (i.e. 
evaluations of ‘Democratic’ aligned groups by Democratic respondents) and party out-groups (i.e. 
evaluations of ‘Republican’ aligned groups by Democratic respondents) over time with 95% CIs. The right-
hand graph explores the difference between these two scores.  
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Table OA1: Comparison of Results: Full Sample vs. FTF Only in 2012 & 2016 
 
 2012 ANES 2016 ANES 
 Full Sample Only FTF Full Sample Only FTF 
Democrats     
Democratic Groups 8.33 
[7.70, 8.96] 
3.64  
[2.88, 4.40] 
9.50 
[8.08, 10.92] 
9.84 
[8.46, 11.22] 
Republican Groups -12.05 
[-12.98, -11.12] 
-4.92 
[-5.92, -3.92] 
-7.91 
[-9.78, -6.05] 
-8.69 
[-10.41, -6.96] 
     
Republicans     
Democratic Groups -7.80 
[-8.56, -7.04] 
-7.66 
[-8.80, -6.52] 
-10.55 
[-12.04, -9.07] 
-10.38 
[-11.85, -8.91] 
Republican Groups 12.21 
[11.55, 12.88] 
10.12 
[9.07, 11.16] 
10.48 
[9.45, 11.52] 
8.21 
[7.25, 9.17] 
     
Social Group 
Polarization 
    
In-Groups 10.11 
[9.65, 10.58] 
6.62 
[5.95, 7.28] 
9.97 
[9.09, 10.86] 
9.05 
[8.20, 9.91] 
Out-Groups -6.18 
[-6.93, -5.42] 
-6.18 
[-6.93, -5.42] 
-9.19 
[-10.39, -7.99] 
-9.51 
[-10.64, -8.37] 
Difference 19.86 
[18.95, 20.78] 
12.80 
[11.57, 14.02] 
19.16 
[17.20, 21.13] 
18.56 
[16.69, 20.43] 
Notes: Cells provide the mean scores on the factor dimensions and polarization measures separately for 
models of the Full Sample and the non-Online Sample.  
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Figure OA2: Group Ratings by ‘Pure’ Independents 
 
Notes: Markers provide the mean ratings given to the two parties social group coalitions by Independent 
respondents in the ANES TS.  
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Table OA2. 1980 CFA Results 
 Democratic Dimension Republican Dimension 
 Unstandardized Standardized Unstandardized Standardized 
Liberals 1.00 (fixed) 0.43   
Blacks 0.41 0.20   
Civil Rights Leaders 1.44 0.59   
Black Militants 1.77 0.59   
Ppl. On Welfare 0.75 0.31   
     
Unions 0.77 0.32   
Women’s Movement 1.08 0.39   
Hispanics 0.22 0.11   
Environmentalists 0.24 0.11   
     
Conservatives   1.00 (fixed) 0.33 
Whites   1.33 0.48 
Big Business   0.06 0.02 
Businessmen   1.42 0.53 
Military   0.92 0.28 
Southerners   0.57 0.19 
Workingmen   1.25 0.45 
Middleclass   1.68 0.60 
     
Fit Statistics     
RMSEA 0.095    
CFI 0.790    
Χ2 (p-value) 2645.867 (0.000)    
Χ2/df 15.56    
Stand. Root Square 
Mean Residual 
0.098    
     
Correlations:      
w/Republican 
Dimension 
-0.97    
w/Democratic Party 
Therm. 
0.29  -0.27  
w/Republican Party 
Therm. 
-0.26  0.24  
 
Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Poor People, Government 
Employees, and Evangelicals 
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Table OA3. 1984 CFA Results 
 Democratic Dimension Republican Dimension 
 Unstandardized Standardized Unstandardized Standardized 
Liberals 1.00 (fixed) 0.47   
Blacks 0.63 0.34   
Civil Rights Leaders 1.35 0.56   
Black Militants 1.91 0.67   
Unions 1.08 0.45   
Ppl. On Welfare 1.08 0.47   
Poor 0.14 0.08   
Hispanics 0.71 0.36   
Women’s Mvt 1.11 0.48   
Women 0.17 0.09   
Gays 1.97 0.64   
Conservatives    1.00 (fixed) 0.39 
Big Business   1.65 0.56 
Evangelical   2.31 0.68 
Anti-abortion   1.66 0.47 
Military   0.83 0.32 
     
Fit Statistics     
RMSEA 0.125    
CFI 0.702    
Χ2 (p-value) 5527.456 (0.000)    
Χ2/df 36.36    
Stand. Root Square 
Mean Residual 
0.281    
     
Correlations:      
w/Republican 
Dimension 
0.51    
w/Democratic Party 
Therm. 
0.25  -0.08  
w/Republican Party 
Therm. 
-0.21  0.22  
Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Whites, Middle Class, and 
Elderly 
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Table OA4. 1988 CFA Results  
 Democratic Dimension Republican Dimension 
 Unstandardized Standardized Unstandardized Standardized 
Liberals 1.00 (fixed) 0.55   
Blacks 0.64 0.39   
Civil Rights Leaders 1.20 0.62   
Hispanics 0.67 0.41   
Illegal Immigrants 1.38 0.60   
Unions 0.89 0.43   
Ppl. On Welfare 0.95 0.50   
Poor 0.23 0.15   
Environmentalists 0.15 0.09   
Homosexuals 1.41 0.55   
Feminists 1.06 0.54   
Catholics 0.26 0.16   
     
Conservatives   1.00 (fixed) 0.24 
Big Business   1.27 0.28 
Military   0.53 0.13 
Anti-abortion   2.21 0.37 
Christian 
Fundamentalists 
  2.86 0.57 
Evangelical   4.21 0.69 
     
Fit Statistics     
RMSEA 0.106    
CFI 0.677    
Χ2 5044.067    
Χ2/df 24.02    
Stand. Root Square 
Mean Residual 
0.209    
     
Correlations:      
w/Republican 
Dimension 
0.47    
w/Democratic Party 
Therm. 
0.28  -0.001  
w/Republican Party 
Therm. 
-0.27  0.04  
Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Whites, Women, Jews, and 
the Elderly 
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Table OA5. 1992 CFA Results  
 Democratic Dimension Republican Dimension 
 Unstandardized Standardized Unstandardized Standardized 
Liberals 1.00 (fixed) 0.58   
Blacks 0.14 0.10   
Unions 0.70 0.36   
Hispanics 0.06 0.04   
Ppl. On Welfare 0.48 0.30   
Poor People 0.12 0.09   
Women’s Mvt 1.10 0.62   
Feminists 1.33 0.72   
Environmentalists 0.54 0.32   
Homosexuals 0.91 0.41   
Illegal Immigrants 0.46 0.24   
Lawyers 0.37 0.21   
Conservatives   1.00 (fixed) 0.43 
Whites   0.67 032 
Southerners   0.61 0.29 
Big Business   0.82 0.35 
Military   1.29 0.54 
Police   1.03 0.44 
Christian 
Fundamentalists 
  1.02 0.39 
Catholics   0.42 0.19 
     
     
Fit Statistics     
RMSEA 0.101    
CFI 0.729    
Χ2  6038.421    
Χ2/df 26.25    
Stand. Root Square 
Mean Residual 
0.129    
     
Correlations:      
w/Republican 
Dimension 
-0.48    
w/Democratic Party 
Therm. 
0.38  -0.21  
w/Republican Party 
Therm. 
-0.32  0.39  
Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Jews, Asians, Immigrants 
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Table OA6. 1996 CFA Results  
 Democratic Dimension Republican Dimension 
 Unstandardized Standardized Unstandardized Standardized 
Liberals 1.00 (fixed) 0.71   
Unions 0.54 0.39   
Blacks 0.09 0.09   
Hispanics 0.14 0.13   
Ppl. On Welfare 0.33 0.26   
Women’s Mvt 0.71 0.52   
Environmentalists 0.61 0.47   
Homosexuals 0.98 0.53   
Conservatives   1.00 (fixed) 0.42 
Big Business   0.46 0.20 
Military   0.48 0.21 
Christian 
Fundamentalists 
  1.89 0.70 
Christian Coalition   2.02 0.75 
     
Fit Statistics     
RMSEA 0.110    
CFI 0.795    
Χ2 (p-value) 2241.737    
Χ2/df 21.55    
Stand. Root Square 
Mean Residual 
0.149    
     
Correlations:      
w/Republican 
Dimension 
-0.49    
w/Democratic Party 
Therm. 
0.46  -0.22  
w/Republican Party 
Therm. 
-0.41  0.34  
Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Poor People, Whites, and 
the Elderly 
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Table OA7. 2000 CFA Results   
 Democratic Dimension Republican Dimension 
 Unstandardized Standardized Unstandardized Standardized 
Liberals 1.00 (fixed) 0.58   
Unions 0.75 0.40   
Ppl. On Welfare 0.43 0.26   
Women’s Mvt 0.90 0.54   
Feminists 0.13 0.63   
Environmentalists 0.67 0.41   
Homosexuals 0.89 0.42   
Conservatives   1.00 (Fixed) 0.51 
Big Business   0.75 0.38 
Military   0.63 0.32 
Christian 
Fundamentalists 
  1.40 0.66 
Christian Coalition   1.46 0.68 
Catholics   0.23 0.14 
Protestants   0.26 0.16 
Whites   0.08 0.05 
     
Fit Statistics     
RMSEA 0.097    
CFI 0.820    
Χ2 (p-value) 3444.447    
Χ2/df 17.94    
Stand. Root Square 
Mean Residual 
0.184    
     
Correlations:      
w/Republican 
Dimension 
-0.05    
w/Democratic Party 
Therm. 
0.36  -0.19  
w/Republican Party 
Therm. 
-0.27  0.31  
Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Blacks, Hispanics, Poor 
People, Asians, Jews, and the Elderly.  
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Table OA8. 2004 CFA Results   
 Democratic Dimension Republican Dimension 
 Unstandardized Standardized Unstandardized Standardized 
Liberals 1.00 (fixed) 0.65   
Unions 0.60 0.38   
Welfare 0.48 0.34   
Environmentalists 0.63 0.45   
Homosexuals 0.97 0.52   
Illegal Immigrants 0.90 0.50   
Feminists 0.91 0.59   
Muslims 0.59 0.40   
Blacks 0.08 0.07   
Poor 0.06 0.05   
Asians 0.14 0.12   
     
Conservatives   1.00 (fixed) 0.55 
Whites   0.15 0.10 
Southerners   0.30 0.20 
Big Business   1.08 0.57 
Business   0.59 0.38 
Military   0.60 0.33 
Christian 
Fundamentalists 
  1.03 0.50 
Men   0.25 0.16 
Rich   0.65 0.38 
Catholic Church   0.75 0.39 
Catholics   0.44 0.27 
Middle Class   0.05 0.04 
     
Fit Statistics     
RMSEA 0.092    
CFI 0.791    
Χ2 (p-value) 4261.547    
Χ2/df 11.21    
Stand. Root Square 
Mean Residual 
0.173    
     
Correlations:      
w/Republican 
Dimension 
-0.12    
w/Democratic Party 
Therm. 
0.35  -0.24  
w/Republican Party 
Therm. 
-0.39  0.44  
Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension:. Working Class, Women,  
Jews, Hispanics, Elderly, and the Young 
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Table OA9. 2008 CFA Results   
 Democratic Dimension Republican Dimension 
 Unstandardized Standardized Unstandardized Standardized 
Liberals 1.00 (fixed) 0.40   
Unions 0.45 0.17   
Ppl. On Welfare 0.38 0.15   
Blacks 0.03 0.02   
Hispanics 0.38 0.17   
Asians 0.26 0.13   
Jews 0.14 0.06   
Feminists 0.77 0.31   
Environmentalists 0.56 0.23   
Homosexuals 1.72 0.53   
Illegal Immigrants 1.30 0.42   
Muslims 1.36 0.52   
Hindus 1.05 0.45   
Atheists 1.82 0.55   
Conservatives   1.00 (fixed) 0.27 
Southerners   0.87 0.25 
Big Business   0.50 0.12 
Military   1.52 0.38 
Christian 
Fundamentalists 
  1.33 0.33 
Christians   1.58 0.45 
Catholics   0.38 0.11 
Rich   0.17 0.05 
Middle Class   0.58 0.18 
     
Fit Statistics     
RMSEA 0.089    
CFI 0.794    
Χ2 (p-value) 4833.402    
Χ2/df 19.33    
Stand. Root Square 
Mean Residual 
0.101    
     
Correlations:      
w/Republican 
Dimension 
-0.99    
w/Democratic Party 
Therm. 
0.21  -0.21  
w/Republican Party 
Therm. 
-0.28  0.28  
Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Whites 
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 Table OA10. 2012 CFA Results    
 Democratic Dimension Republican Dimension 
 Unstandardized Standardized Unstandardized Standardized 
Liberals 1 0.58   
Unions 0.70 0.39   
Blacks 0.28 0.17   
Hispanics 0.31 0.19   
Ppl. On Welfare 0.54 0.33   
Poor 0.06 0.04   
Asians 0.26 0.17   
Homosexuals 0.97 0.48   
Illegal Immigrants 0.72 0.34   
Feminists 0.75 0.44   
Muslims 0.84 0.49   
Atheists 0.91 0.41   
Conservatives   1 0.70 
Whites   0.04 0.03 
Big Business   0.64 0.45 
Military   0.18 0.15 
Christian 
Fundamentalists 
  0.63 0.43 
Christians   0.37 0.29 
Catholics   0.34 0.26 
Rich   0.54 0.38 
Mormons   0.51 0.36 
Tea Party   1.07 0.63 
     
Fit Statistics     
RMSEA 0.111    
CFI 0.595    
Χ2 (p-value) 0.00    
Χ2/df 26.28    
Stand. Root Square 
Mean Residual 
0.131    
     
Correlations:      
w/Republican 
Dimension 
-0.58    
w/Democratic Party 
Therm. 
0.52  -0.49  
w/Republican Party 
Therm. 
-0.49  0.61  
Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Middle Class; Working Class 
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Table OA11. 2016 CFA Results    
 Democratic Dimension Republican Dimension 
 Unstandardized Standardized Unstandardized Standardized 
Liberals 1 0.68   
Feminists 0.87 0.61   
Unions 0.50 0.36   
Poor 0.08 0.07   
Gays & Lesbians 0.92 0.61   
Muslims 0.75 0.55   
Transgender 0.95 0.64   
Scientists 0.30 0.26   
Black Lives Matter 1.15 0.65   
Asians 0.14 0.13   
Hispanics 0.23 0.19   
Blacks 0.23 0.19   
Illegal Immigrants 0.73 0.45   
Conservatives   1 0.69 
Christian 
Fundamentalists 
  1.02 0.63 
Big Business   0.66 0.47 
Rich   0.40 0.32 
Christians   0.60 0.45 
Tea Party   1.00 0.63 
Police   0.52 0.38 
     
Fit Statistics     
RMSEA 0.125    
CFI 0.662    
Χ2 (p-value) 0.000    
Χ2/df 17.65    
Stand. Root Square 
Mean Residual 
0.116    
     
Correlations:      
w/Republican 
Dimension 
-0.80    
w/Democratic Party 
Therm. 
0.59  -0.46  
w/Republican Party 
Therm. 
-0.49  0.56  
Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Whites and Jews 
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Appendix B 
 
 In this Appendix we provide the full model results for the results reported in text. These are 
provided in Tables OB1 to OB5. Table OB6, meanwhile, provides an overview of analyses wherein we focus 
not on the polarization between in and outgroup evaluations but on them separately as predictor variables. 
There is some evidence here that the Out-Group dimension is more strongly related to Party Polarization 
and Sorting, and the In-Group dimension to PID Strength, but this evidence is rather uneven at best.  
In the foregoing analyses we estimate the inter-relationship between social group polarization and 
our dependent variables via a three-wave cross-lagged model estimated using STATA’s structural equation 
modeling (SEM) estimator. In the remainder of Appendix B we analyze the data via alternative modeling 
strategies. First, we provide results looking at cross-lagged OLS models (estimated via seeming-unrelated 
regressions) for each of the panel dyads (i.e. 1992  1994, 1994  1996, and 1992  1996). This is 
analogous to what we do via the SEM model but broken up into separate pieces. These analyses are 
presented in Tables OB7-OB11. Second, we leverage the panel nature of the data to fit fixed effect panel 
regressions, which are akin to estimating first differences (i.e. does the change in X predict the change in Y); 
these analyses are presented in Tables OB12-OB16. In these analyses, we fit two sets of models; for the first 
we focus only on those respondents who completed all three of the panel waves (as we do by necessity in 
the SEM models reported in text), while the latter focus on all respondents. In these models we control for 
time variant predictors common to all waves of the panel as well as dummy variables for panel wave. These 
results are substantially similar to those reported in the SEM models, although we see a weakened 
influence of social group polarization on PID strength in the 1992-1996 fixed effect models.  
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Table OB1. Party Polarization and Social Group Polarization, 1992-1994-1996  
 (1)    
     
 Party Polarization 
(1996) 
Party Polarization  
(1994) 
Social Group 
Polarization (1994) 
Social Group 
Polarization (1996) 
Party Polarization (t-1) 0.573** 
(0.0602) 
0.262** 
(0.0338) 
0.0504+ 
(0.0290) 
0.118* 
(0.0490) 
     
Social Group 
Polarization (t-1) 
0.251** 
(0.0659) 
0.161** 
(0.0417) 
0.424** 
(0.0358) 
0.707** 
(0.0537) 
     
Issue Extremity (1992) 0.0439+ 
(0.0255) 
0.0259 
(0.0207) 
-0.00948 
(0.0178) 
0.00792 
(0.0207) 
     
Ideology Strength 
(1992) 
0.0214 
(0.0225) 
0.0277 
(0.0180) 
0.0649** 
(0.0155) 
0.0293 
(0.0183) 
     
Follow Politics (1992) -0.0304 
(0.0241) 
0.0502** 
(0.0193) 
0.0258 
(0.0166) 
0.0336+ 
(0.0196) 
     
Racial Resentment 
(1992) 
-0.00486 
(0.0285) 
0.0572* 
(0.0231) 
0.00868 
(0.0198) 
0.0144 
(0.0232) 
     
Gender 0.00876 
(0.0131) 
0.0109 
(0.0106) 
-0.00180 
(0.00907) 
-0.0137 
(0.0107) 
     
Race -0.00158 
(0.0197) 
0.00686 
(0.0159) 
-0.00998 
(0.0137) 
-0.0219 
(0.0161) 
     
Education (1992) -0.0261 
(0.0209) 
0.00498 
(0.0169) 
0.0338* 
(0.0145) 
0.0144 
(0.0170) 
     
Age (1992) 0.0430 
(0.0298) 
-0.0392+ 
(0.0238) 
-0.0582** 
(0.0205) 
-0.00277 
(0.0242) 
     
Constant 0.0850+ 
(0.0477) 
0.344** 
(0.0338) 
0.273** 
(0.0290) 
-0.0197 
(0.0388) 
Error Covariances     
Wave 2 0.00338** 
(0.000495) 
   
Wave 3 0.00258** 
(0.000692) 
   
N 425    
Log-Likelihood 1175.1    
Chi2 45.30    
RMSEA 0.156    
CFI 0.957    
SRMR 0.0191    
     
Wald Tests p  =    
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = 
(Partyt1 -> (SGPt2) 
0.0382    
(SGPt2 -> Partyt3) = 
(Partyt2 -> (SGPt3) 
0.119    
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Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Table OB2. Social Group Polarization and PID Strength, 1992-1994-1996 
 (1)    
 PID Strength (1996) PID Strength (1994) Social Group 
Polarization (1994) 
Social Group 
Polarization (1996) 
PID Strength (t-1) 0.573** 
(0.0383) 
0.312** 
(0.0274) 
0.00394 
(0.0113) 
0.0273 
(0.0206) 
     
Social Group Polarization 
(t-1) 
0.195* 
(0.0908) 
0.212* 
(0.0833) 
0.441** 
(0.0344) 
0.757** 
(0.0487) 
     
Issue Extremity (1992) 0.0237 
(0.0385) 
-0.0231 
(0.0428) 
-0.00519 
(0.0177) 
0.0143 
(0.0207) 
     
Ideology Strength (1992) 0.0217 
(0.0343) 
0.0136 
(0.0376) 
0.0665** 
(0.0155) 
0.0291 
(0.0184) 
     
Follow Politics (1992) -0.0254 
(0.0366) 
0.0164 
(0.0403) 
0.0254 
(0.0167) 
0.0373+ 
(0.0197) 
     
Racial Resentment (1992) -0.0484 
(0.0432) 
-0.00460 
(0.0480) 
0.00718 
(0.0198) 
0.0202 
(0.0232) 
     
Gender 0.0163 
(0.0200) 
-0.00514 
(0.0221) 
-0.00171 
(0.00911) 
-0.0124 
(0.0107) 
     
Race -0.0157 
(0.0301) 
0.0461 
(0.0332) 
-0.00802 
(0.0137) 
-0.0213 
(0.0162) 
     
Education (1992) -0.0690* 
(0.0319) 
0.0162 
(0.0352) 
0.0324* 
(0.0145) 
0.0126 
(0.0171) 
     
Age (1992) 0.0872+ 
(0.0455) 
-0.0301 
(0.0501) 
-0.0574** 
(0.0207) 
-0.00471 
(0.0244) 
     
Constant 0.226** 
(0.0697) 
0.458** 
(0.0659) 
0.290** 
(0.0272) 
0.00323 
(0.0374) 
Error Covariances     
Wave 2 0.000643 
(0.000977) 
   
Wave 3 -0.0000691 
(0.00104) 
   
N 425    
Log Likelihood 244.4    
Chi2 64.03    
RMSEA 0.188    
CFI 0.935    
SRMR 0.0214    
     
Wald Tests p =     
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 
-> (SGPt2) 
0.0722    
(SGPt2 -> Partyt3) = (Partyt2 
-> (SGPt3) 
0.0135    
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Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Table OB3. Social Group Polarization and Party/Ideological Sorting, 1992-1994-1996  
 (1)    
     
 Partisan/Ideological 
Sorting (1996) 
Partisan/Ideological 
Sorting (1994) 
Social Group 
Polarization (1994) 
Social Group 
Polarization (1996) 
Partisan/Ideological 
Sorting (t-1) 
0.643** 
(0.0403) 
0.374** 
(0.0433) 
0.0847** 
(0.0225) 
0.100** 
(0.0283) 
     
Social Group Polarization 
(t-1) 
0.309** 
(0.0730) 
0.378** 
(0.0677) 
0.442** 
(0.0351) 
0.704** 
(0.0514) 
     
Issue Extremity (1992) 0.0838** 
(0.0291) 
0.0128 
(0.0342) 
-0.00510 
(0.0178) 
0.0122 
(0.0205) 
     
Follow Politics (1992) -0.00931 
(0.0275) 
-0.00214 
(0.0322) 
0.0264 
(0.0167) 
0.0402* 
(0.0194) 
     
Racial Resentment (1992) 0.0217 
(0.0325) 
0.0321 
(0.0385) 
0.00811 
(0.0200) 
0.0174 
(0.0229) 
     
Gender -0.00442 
(0.0152) 
-0.0404* 
(0.0176) 
-0.00298 
(0.00914) 
-0.00896 
(0.0107) 
     
Race -0.0267 
(0.0226) 
-0.0196 
(0.0264) 
-0.00932 
(0.0137) 
-0.0186 
(0.0159) 
     
Education (1992) 0.0362 
(0.0241) 
0.0325 
(0.0281) 
0.0321* 
(0.0146) 
0.0107 
(0.0169) 
     
Age (1992) -0.0175 
(0.0343) 
-0.0459 
(0.0397) 
-0.0591** 
(0.0206) 
-0.00297 
(0.0241) 
     
Constant -0.158** 
(0.0504) 
0.0747 
(0.0525) 
0.294** 
(0.0272) 
0.0251 
(0.0355) 
Error Covariances     
Wave 2 0.00485** 
(0.000819) 
   
Wave 3 0.00306** 
(0.000795) 
   
N 425    
Log Likelihood 847.7    
Chi2 44.39    
RMSEA 0.154    
CFI 0.966    
SRMR 0.0172    
     
Wald Tests     
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 
-> (SGPt2) 
0.00990    
(SGPt2 -> Partyt3) = (Partyt2 
-> (SGPt3) 
0.0000687    
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table OB4. Social Group Polarization and PID Strength, 2000-2002-2004  
 (1)    
 PID Str (2004) PID Str. (2002) Social Group 
Polarization (2002) 
Social Group 
Polarization (2004) 
PID Str. (t-1) 0.653** 
(0.0319) 
0.365** 
(0.0207) 
0.0343** 
(0.0115) 
-0.00602 
(0.0184) 
     
Social Group Polarization 
(t-1) 
0.124* 
(0.0616) 
0.0795 
(0.0715) 
0.522** 
(0.0398) 
0.578** 
(0.0356) 
     
Pol. Interest (2000) 0.000282 
(0.0298) 
0.0178 
(0.0314) 
0.0431* 
(0.0175) 
0.0460** 
(0.0172) 
     
Avg. Issue Extremity 
(2002) 
-0.00893 
(0.0343) 
-0.00637 
(0.0359) 
0.0270 
(0.0200) 
0.0122 
(0.0198) 
     
Ideology Str. (2000) -0.0252 
(0.0299) 
0.0904** 
(0.0317) 
0.0543** 
(0.0176) 
0.0539** 
(0.0173) 
     
Racial Resentment (2000) -0.0300 
(0.0350) 
0.0175 
(0.0367) 
0.0244 
(0.0204) 
-0.0669** 
(0.0202) 
     
Gender 0.0494** 
(0.0167) 
0.0322+ 
(0.0174) 
-0.00860 
(0.00968) 
0.0188+ 
(0.00963) 
     
Race 0.0177 
(0.0248) 
0.0864** 
(0.0259) 
0.0129 
(0.0144) 
-0.0493** 
(0.0143) 
     
Education -0.0616* 
(0.0292) 
-0.0210 
(0.0304) 
0.0380* 
(0.0169) 
0.0291+ 
(0.0168) 
     
Age (2000) 0.0313 
(0.0443) 
-0.0214 
(0.0469) 
0.0108 
(0.0261) 
-0.0710** 
(0.0256) 
     
Constant 0.282** 
(0.0518) 
0.397** 
(0.0570) 
0.000541 
(0.0317) 
0.191** 
(0.0299) 
Error Covariances     
Wave 2 0.00356** 
(0.000958) 
   
Wave 3 0.00328** 
(0.000907) 
   
N 621    
Log-Likelihood 608.2    
Chi2 153.88    
RMSEA 0.246    
CFI 0.897    
SRMR 0.0259    
     
Wald Tests     
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 
-> (SGPt2) 
0.534    
(SGPt2 -> Partyt3) = (Partyt2 
-> (SGPt3) 
0.0443    
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01  
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Table OB5. Social Group Polarization and Party Sorting, 2000-2002 
 (1)  
   
 Sorting (2002) Social Group Polarization 
(2002) 
Sorting (2000) 0.470** 
(0.0267) 
0.117** 
(0.0159) 
   
Social Group Polarization (2000) 0.280** 
(0.0575) 
0.464** 
(0.0342) 
   
Pol. Interest (2000) 0.0354 
(0.0247) 
0.0429** 
(0.0147) 
   
Avg. Issue Extremity (2000) 0.0259 
(0.0273) 
0.0196 
(0.0162) 
   
Racial Resentment (2000) 0.0709* 
(0.0288) 
0.0196 
(0.0171) 
   
Gender 0.0162 
(0.0138) 
-0.00626 
(0.00818) 
   
Race 0.0215 
(0.0188) 
0.0144 
(0.0112) 
   
Age (2000) 0.0462+ 
(0.0236) 
0.0319* 
(0.0140) 
   
Education (2000)   
   
Constant -0.0922* 
(0.0438) 
0.0360 
(0.0260) 
N 831  
Log Likelihood 381.2  
Chi2 62.55  
RMSEA 0.272  
CFI 0.929  
SRMR 0.0187  
Wald Tests   
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 -> (SGPt2) 0.00628  
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table OB6: The Reciprocal Relationship Between Social Group Polarization & Party Affective Polarization, 
PID Strength, and Party/Ideological Sorting 
 1992-1994-1996 2000-2002-2004 
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 Party 
Polarization 
PID Strength Sorting PID Strength Sorting 
Cross-Lag 
Coefficient 
     
T1 In-Groups -> 
T2 Party 
0.103* 
(0.0469) 
0.264** 
(0.0967) 
0.111 
(0.0770) 
0.0519 
(0.0737) 
0.174** 
(0.0573) 
      
T1 Out-Groups 
-> T2 Party 
0.116** 
(0.0432) 
0.0507 
(0.0883) 
0.377** 
(0.0710) 
0.0602 
(0.0661) 
0.218** 
(0.0538) 
      
T2 In-Groups -> 
T3 Party 
0.00601 
(0.135) 
0.119 
(0.206) 
0.154 
(0.154) 
0.164** 
(0.0609) 
N/A 
      
T2 Out-Groups 
-> T3 Party 
0.240* 
(0.117) 
0.0886 
(0.171) 
0.127 
(0.133) 
0.0497 
(0.0645) 
N/A 
      
T1 Party -> T2 
 In-Groups 
0.0482+ 
(0.0265) 
-0.000634 
(0.0104) 
0.00913 
(0.0300) 
0.00939 
(0.0124) 
0.108** 
(0.0243) 
      
T1 Party -> T2 
Out-Groups  
0.0516+ 
(0.0304) 
0.0144 
(0.0120) 
0.0510 
(0.0344) 
0.0319** 
(0.0113) 
0.0705** 
(0.0218) 
      
T2 Party -> T2  
In-Groups 
0.0352 
(0.0428) 
0.0124 
(0.0177) 
0.0509* 
(0.0256) 
0.00311 
(0.0168) 
N/A 
      
T2 Party -> T3  
Out-Groups 
0.117** 
(0.0381) 
0.0260 
(0.0159) 
0.0750** 
(0.0228) 
-0.0117 
(0.0197) 
N/A 
      
N =  425 425 425 621 831 
      
Wald Tests      
T1 In-Groups = 
T1 Out-Groups 
p = 0.851 p = 0.144 p < 0.05 p = 0.931 p = 0.559 
      
T2 In-Groups = 
T2 Out-Groups 
p = 0.334 p = 0.934 p = 0.922 p = 0.151  
 
Notes: Cell entries provide the unstandardized coefficients for the Party variables (Party Polarization, PID 
Strength, and Partisan/Ideological Sorting) and for the In-Groups and Out-Groups dimensions. T1 = 1992 or 
2000; T2 = 1994 or 2002; T3 = 1996 or 2004. The Cross-Lagged coefficients show the reciprocal influence of 
these variables on each other after controlling for the lagged values of the DV. The Wald tests test whether 
we can reject the null that the influence of T1 In-Groups on the Party variable is equivalent to the T1 Out-
Groups variable on the same Party Variable. Note that the Out-Groups variable here is reverse coded such 
that higher scores indicate increasing dislike for groups associated with the out-party rather than increasing 
like.  
 
 
Table OB7. Social Group Polarization and Party Polarization, 1992-1994-1996 (SUREG Models) 
 1992-1994 1992-1996 1994-1996 
 Party 
Polarization 
(1994) 
SGP (1994) Party 
Polarization 
(1996) 
SGP (1992) Party 
Polarization 
(1996) 
SGP (1996) 
Party Polarization 0.265** 0.0600* 0.311** 0.0428 0.554** 0.0634* 
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(t-1) (0.0322) (0.0276) (0.0447) (0.0371) (0.0391) (0.0292) 
       
Social Group 
Polarization (t-1)) 
0.120** 
(0.0406) 
0.399** 
(0.0348) 
0.248** 
(0.0548) 
0.494** 
(0.0455) 
0.207** 
(0.0437) 
0.657** 
(0.0326) 
       
Ideology Strength 
(t-1) 
0.0455** 
(0.0174) 
0.0679** 
(0.0149) 
0.0395+ 
(0.0237) 
0.0592** 
(0.0196) 
-0.00995 
(0.0186) 
0.0420** 
(0.0139) 
       
Issue Extremity (t-
1) 
0.0215 
(0.0200) 
-0.00880 
(0.0171) 
0.0302 
(0.0273) 
-0.00869 
(0.0227) 
0.0350+ 
(0.0193) 
-0.0177 
(0.0144) 
       
Follow Politics (t-
1) 
0.0407* 
(0.0185) 
0.0243 
(0.0158) 
0.0000339 
(0.0255) 
0.0452* 
(0.0211) 
0.000706 
(0.0163) 
0.0302* 
(0.0121) 
       
Racial 
Resentment 
(1992) 
0.0442* 
(0.0221) 
0.00814 
(0.0189) 
0.0491 
(0.0305) 
0.0339 
(0.0253) 
 
 
 
 
       
Age (t-1) -0.0218 
(0.0227) 
-0.0508** 
(0.0194) 
0.00431 
(0.0312) 
-0.0384 
(0.0259) 
0.0454* 
(0.0207) 
-0.0173 
(0.0155) 
       
Education (t-1) 0.00983 
(0.0163) 
0.0372** 
(0.0140) 
-0.0171 
(0.0220) 
0.0216 
(0.0183) 
-0.0405** 
(0.0149) 
0.0227* 
(0.0111) 
       
Female 0.00489 
(0.0102) 
-0.00151 
(0.00874) 
0.00813 
(0.0140) 
-0.0127 
(0.0116) 
0.0181+ 
(0.00952) 
0.00145 
(0.00710) 
       
       
Non-White -0.00172 
(0.0150) 
-0.0181 
(0.0128) 
-0.00476 
(0.0211) 
-0.0231 
(0.0175) 
0.00835 
(0.0140) 
-0.0380** 
(0.0104) 
       
Constant 0.365** 
(0.0319) 
0.272** 
(0.0273) 
0.253** 
(0.0440) 
0.167** 
(0.0365) 
0.110** 
(0.0286) 
0.0503* 
(0.0213) 
Observations 475  438  987  
r2 0.255 0.456 0.236 0.395 0.285 0.484 
chi2 162.6 398.6 135.0 286.1 393.6 927.4 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table OB8. Social Group Polarization and PID Strength, 1992-1994-1996 (SUREG Models) 
 1992-1994 1992-1996 1994-1996 
 PID Strength SGP PID Strength SGP PID Str SGP 
PID Strength (t-1) 0.334** 
(0.0261) 
0.00525 
(0.0110) 
0.317** 
(0.0267) 
-0.000977 
(0.0144) 
0.562** 
(0.0256) 
0.0135 
(0.0139) 
       
Social Group 
Polarization (t-1) 
0.181* 
(0.0792) 
0.421** 
(0.0333) 
0.197* 
(0.0808) 
0.510** 
(0.0437) 
0.0879 
(0.0576) 
0.676** 
(0.0312) 
       
Ideology Strength 
(t-1) 
0.0333 
(0.0357) 
0.0694** 
(0.0150) 
0.0269 
(0.0364) 
0.0613** 
(0.0197) 
0.0359 
(0.0257) 
0.0448** 
(0.0139) 
       
Issue Extremity (t-
1) 
-0.00656 
(0.0406) 
-0.00533 
(0.0171) 
-0.00150 
(0.0416) 
-0.00503 
(0.0225) 
0.0401 
(0.0264) 
-0.0138 
(0.0143) 
       
Follow Politics(t-
1) 
0.00603 
(0.0378) 
0.0235 
(0.0159) 
-0.0227 
(0.0391) 
0.0452* 
(0.0212) 
-0.000536 
(0.0226) 
0.0306* 
(0.0122) 
       
Racial 
Resentment 
(1992) 
0.00531 
(0.0452) 
0.00679 
(0.0190) 
-0.0305 
(0.0468) 
0.0327 
(0.0253) 
 
 
 
 
       
Age (t-1) -0.00571 
(0.0467) 
-0.0496* 
(0.0196) 
0.0257 
(0.0484) 
-0.0361 
(0.0262) 
0.0882** 
(0.0287) 
-0.0174 
(0.0155) 
       
Education (t-1) 0.0235 
(0.0334) 
0.0364** 
(0.0141) 
-0.0338 
(0.0338) 
0.0204 
(0.0183) 
-0.0420* 
(0.0205) 
0.0230* 
(0.0111) 
       
Female -0.00330 
(0.0209) 
-0.00102 
(0.00879) 
0.00296 
(0.0214) 
-0.0123 
(0.0116) 
0.0235+ 
(0.0131) 
0.00267 
(0.00709) 
       
Non-White 0.0375 
(0.0307) 
-0.0163 
(0.0129) 
-0.00726 
(0.0322) 
-0.0207 
(0.0174) 
0.0197 
(0.0194) 
-0.0386** 
(0.0105) 
       
Constant 0.427** 
(0.0613) 
0.292** 
(0.0258) 
0.489** 
(0.0634) 
0.182** 
(0.0343) 
0.217** 
(0.0358) 
0.0678** 
(0.0194) 
Observations 475  438  987  
r2 0.295 0.451 0.285 0.393 0.386 0.482 
chi2 198.5 390.4 174.7 283.9 620.0 920.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table OB9. Social Group Polarization and PID Strength, 1992-1994-1996 (SUREG Models) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 1992-1994 1992-1996 1994-1996 
 Sorting SGP Sorting SGP Sorting SGP 
Partisan/Ideological 
Sorting (t-1) 
0.397** 
(0.0412) 
0.0971** 
(0.0217) 
0.408** 
(0.0441) 
0.0824** 
(0.0288) 
0.584** 
(0.0292) 
0.0875** 
(0.0193) 
       
Social Group 
Polarization (t-1) 
0.333** 
(0.0646) 
0.416** 
(0.0339) 
0.381** 
(0.0684) 
0.505** 
(0.0446) 
0.327** 
(0.0493) 
0.648** 
(0.0326) 
       
Issue Extremity (t-1) 0.00664 
(0.0326) 
-0.00565 
(0.0171) 
0.0720* 
(0.0346) 
-0.00547 
(0.0225) 
-0.00234 
(0.0215) 
-0.0155 
(0.0142) 
       
Follow Politics(t-1) -0.00503 
(0.0304) 
0.0238 
(0.0159) 
-0.0213 
(0.0325) 
0.0454* 
(0.0212) 
0.00957 
(0.0184) 
0.0283* 
(0.0121) 
       
Racial Resentment 
(t-1) 
0.0226 
(0.0364) 
0.00870 
(0.0191) 
0.0638 
(0.0390) 
0.0338 
(0.0254) 
 
 
 
 
       
Age (t-1) -0.0281 
(0.0371) 
-0.0500* 
(0.0195) 
-0.0536 
(0.0398) 
-0.0384 
(0.0259) 
-0.0260 
(0.0233) 
-0.0167 
(0.0154) 
       
Education (t-1) 0.0352 
(0.0268) 
0.0357* 
(0.0141) 
0.0542+ 
(0.0281) 
0.0201 
(0.0183) 
0.0238 
(0.0168) 
0.0202+ 
(0.0111) 
       
Female -0.0363* 
(0.0167) 
-0.00257 
(0.00878) 
-0.0319+ 
(0.0178) 
-0.0134 
(0.0116) 
0.0116 
(0.0106) 
0.00237 
(0.00699) 
       
Non-White -0.0276 
(0.0245) 
-0.0176 
(0.0128) 
-0.0308 
(0.0267) 
-0.0224 
(0.0174) 
-0.0365* 
(0.0158) 
-0.0364** 
(0.0104) 
       
Constant 0.0812+ 
(0.0490) 
0.296** 
(0.0257) 
-0.0478 
(0.0526) 
0.185** 
(0.0343) 
-0.108** 
(0.0283) 
0.0831** 
(0.0187) 
Observations 475  438  987  
r2 0.344 0.448 0.380 0.391 0.507 0.486 
chi2 249.0 386.2 268.8 281.4 1013.7 934.8 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
  
38 
 
Table OB10. Social Group Polarization and PID Strength, 2000-2002-2004 (SUREG Models) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 2000-2002 2000-2004 2002-2004 
 PID St. (t) SGP (t) PID St. (t) SGP (t) PID St. (t) SGP (t) 
PID Str (t-1) 0.356** 
(0.0182) 
0.0324** 
(0.00982) 
0.353** 
(0.0218) 
0.0127 
(0.0112) 
0.636** 
(0.0312) 
-0.00196 
(0.0173) 
       
Social Group 
Polarization (t-1) 
0.121* 
(0.0614) 
0.506** 
(0.0331) 
0.0994 
(0.0752) 
0.639** 
(0.0387) 
0.140* 
(0.0616) 
0.565** 
(0.0341) 
       
Pol. Interest (t-1) 0.0140 
(0.0271) 
0.0427** 
(0.0146) 
0.0101 
(0.0328) 
0.0427* 
(0.0169) 
-0.00731 
(0.0285) 
0.0532** 
(0.0158) 
       
Avg. Issue 
Extremity 
0.0103 
(0.0304) 
0.0174 
(0.0164) 
-0.0130 
(0.0377) 
0.0220 
(0.0194) 
 
 
 
 
       
Ideology Str. (t-1) 0.0684* 
(0.0288) 
0.0581** 
(0.0155) 
-0.00282 
(0.0334) 
0.0386* 
(0.0172) 
-0.0285 
(0.0291) 
0.0488** 
(0.0161) 
       
Racial 
Resentment 
(2000) 
0.0694* 
(0.0320) 
0.0185 
(0.0172) 
-0.00972 
(0.0388) 
-0.0488* 
(0.0199) 
 
 
 
 
       
Gender 0.0149 
(0.0153) 
-0.00780 
(0.00823) 
0.0635** 
(0.0183) 
0.0132 
(0.00942) 
0.0514** 
(0.0162) 
0.0154+ 
(0.00899) 
       
Race 0.0631** 
(0.0208) 
0.00988 
(0.0112) 
0.0667* 
(0.0271) 
-0.0298* 
(0.0140) 
0.0302 
(0.0229) 
-0.0464** 
(0.0127) 
       
Age (t-1) 0.0215 
(0.0385) 
0.0283 
(0.0207) 
0.00359 
(0.0493) 
-0.0401 
(0.0254) 
0.0230 
(0.0431) 
-0.0605* 
(0.0239) 
       
Education -0.0278 
(0.0260) 
0.0373** 
(0.0140) 
-0.0572+ 
(0.0322) 
0.0384* 
(0.0165) 
-0.0434 
(0.0269) 
0.0430** 
(0.0149) 
       
Constant 0.349** 
(0.0480) 
0.00572 
(0.0258) 
0.512** 
(0.0600) 
0.0672* 
(0.0309) 
0.258** 
(0.0398) 
0.148** 
(0.0221) 
Observations 841  637  681  
r2 0.371 0.364 0.341 0.430 0.437 0.436 
chi2 495.7 482.1 329.1 480.7 528.3 525.4 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table. OB11 Social Group Polarization and Party/Ideological Sorting, 2000-2002 (SUREG Models) 
 (1)  
   
 Sorting (2002) Social Group Polarization 
(2002) 
Sorting (2000) 0.470** 
(0.0267) 
0.117** 
(0.0159) 
   
Social Group Polarization (2000) 0.280** 
(0.0575) 
0.464** 
(0.0342) 
   
Pol. Interest 0.0354 
(0.0247) 
0.0429** 
(0.0147) 
   
Avg. Issue Extremity 0.0259 
(0.0273) 
0.0196 
(0.0162) 
   
Racial Resentment (2000) 0.0709* 
(0.0288) 
0.0196 
(0.0171) 
   
Gender 0.0162 
(0.0138) 
-0.00626 
(0.00818) 
   
Race 0.0215 
(0.0188) 
0.0144 
(0.0112) 
   
Age -0.00702 
(0.0347) 
0.0257 
(0.0206) 
   
Education 0.0462+ 
(0.0236) 
0.0319* 
(0.0140) 
   
Constant -0.0922* 
(0.0438) 
0.0360 
(0.0260) 
Observations 831  
r2 0.403 0.381 
chi2 560.5 511.2 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table OB12. Social Group Polarization and Party Polarization, Fixed Effect Regression Model; 1992-1994-
1996 Panel 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1992-1994-1996 
Only 
1992-1994-1996 
Only 
All All 
Social Group 
Polarization 
0.243** 
(0.0420) 
0.234** 
(0.0430) 
0.237** 
(0.0341) 
0.223** 
(0.0350) 
     
1994 0.0620** 
(0.00780) 
0.0626** 
(0.00851) 
0.0620** 
(0.00701) 
0.0669** 
(0.00761) 
     
1996 0.0209** 
(0.00734) 
0.0294** 
(0.00747) 
0.0224** 
(0.00680) 
0.0286** 
(0.00694) 
     
Pol. Interest  
 
0.0421* 
(0.0195) 
 
 
0.0248+ 
(0.0150) 
     
Ideology Strength  
 
0.0275 
(0.0175) 
 
 
0.0365** 
(0.0137) 
     
Issue Extremity  
 
0.0721** 
(0.0195) 
 
 
0.0433** 
(0.0159) 
     
Age  
 
0.00829 
(0.221) 
 
 
-0.216 
(0.173) 
     
Education  
 
-0.0509 
(0.0446) 
 
 
-0.00710 
(0.0349) 
     
Constant 0.458** 
(0.0205) 
0.417** 
(0.0887) 
0.459** 
(0.0167) 
0.502** 
(0.0714) 
Observations 1485 1436 2751 2668 
Respondents 537 533 1214 1204 
R2_Within 0.138 0.164 0.131 0.144 
R2_Between 0.250 0.281 0.200 0.0704 
R2_Overall 0.187 0.233 0.164 0.0897 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table OB13. PID Strength and Social Group Polarization, Fixed Effect Regression; 1992-1994-1996 Panel 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1992-1994-1996 
Only 
1992-1994-1996 
Only 
All All 
Social Group 
Polarization 
0.0105 
(0.0659) 
-0.0181 
(0.0686) 
0.0298 
(0.0517) 
0.00994 
(0.0533) 
     
1994 0.0452** 
(0.0122) 
0.0403** 
(0.0136) 
0.0331** 
(0.0106) 
0.0265* 
(0.0116) 
     
1996 0.0368** 
(0.0115) 
0.0408** 
(0.0119) 
0.0402** 
(0.0103) 
0.0421** 
(0.0106) 
     
Pol. Interest  
 
0.0484 
(0.0312) 
 
 
0.0505* 
(0.0227) 
     
Ideology Strength  
 
0.0845** 
(0.0279) 
 
 
0.0680** 
(0.0209) 
     
Issue Extremity  
 
0.0308 
(0.0312) 
 
 
0.0224 
(0.0241) 
     
Age  
 
-0.0368 
(0.352) 
 
 
0.0973 
(0.264) 
     
Education  
 
-0.0138 
(0.0712) 
 
 
-0.0260 
(0.0531) 
     
Constant 0.653** 
(0.0321) 
0.612** 
(0.141) 
0.653** 
(0.0253) 
0.575** 
(0.108) 
Observations 1485 1436 2751 2668 
Respondents 537 533 1214 1204 
R2_Within 0.0184 0.0318 0.0106 0.0220 
R2_Between 0.000452 0.0405 0.0164 0.103 
R2_Overall 0.00476 0.0362 0.0101 0.0741 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table OB14. Party/Ideological Sorting and Social Group Polarization, Fixed Effect Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1992-1994-1996 
Only 
1992-1994-1996 
Only 
All All 
Social Group 
Polarization 
0.263** 
(0.0527) 
0.232** 
(0.0542) 
0.261** 
(0.0411) 
0.230** 
(0.0424) 
     
1994 0.0680** 
(0.00978) 
0.0676** 
(0.0107) 
0.0673** 
(0.00844) 
0.0677** 
(0.00921) 
     
1996 0.0233* 
(0.00920) 
0.0283** 
(0.00945) 
0.0220** 
(0.00819) 
0.0273** 
(0.00842) 
     
Pol. Interest  
 
0.0812** 
(0.0245) 
 
 
0.0619** 
(0.0181) 
     
Issue Extremity  
 
0.0495* 
(0.0247) 
 
 
0.0559** 
(0.0192) 
     
Age  
 
0.401 
(0.279) 
 
 
0.332 
(0.210) 
     
Education  
 
0.0437 
(0.0563) 
 
 
0.0322 
(0.0423) 
     
Constant 0.127** 
(0.0256) 
-0.115 
(0.112) 
0.116** 
(0.0201) 
-0.0820 
(0.0866) 
Observations 1485 1436 2751 2668 
Respondents 537 533 1214 1204 
R2_Within 0.108 0.129 0.114 0.129 
R2_Between 0.358 0.0541 0.349 0.0807 
R2_Overall 0.220 0.0630 0.229 0.0853 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table OB15. PID Strength and Social Group Polarization, Fixed Effect Regression; 2000-2002-2004 Panel 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 2000-2002-
2004 Only 
2000-2002-
2004 Only 
All All 2000-2002 
Social Group 
Polarization 
0.132** 
(0.0484) 
0.143** 
(0.0524) 
0.0999* 
(0.0451) 
0.0989* 
(0.0498) 
0.0186 
(0.0716) 
      
2002 0.0156 
(0.00997) 
0.0150 
(0.0106) 
0.0113 
(0.00882) 
0.00524 
(0.00969) 
0.0126 
(0.0114) 
      
2004 0.0606** 
(0.00919) 
0.0583** 
(0.0103) 
0.0582** 
(0.00893) 
0.0508** 
(0.0101) 
 
 
      
Pol. Interest  
 
0.0213 
(0.0249) 
 
 
0.0385+ 
(0.0233) 
0.0233 
(0.0341) 
      
Ideology Strength  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.106** 
(0.0303) 
      
Constant 0.632** 
(0.0239) 
0.611** 
(0.0299) 
0.642** 
(0.0219) 
0.619** 
(0.0282) 
0.608** 
(0.0410) 
Observations 2316 2220 2922 2716 1845 
Respondents 823 821 1157 1128 1074 
R2_Within 0.0354 0.0369 0.0282 0.0310 0.0176 
R2_Between 0.0279 0.0357 0.0368 0.0451 0.0822 
R2_Overall 0.0274 0.0322 0.0266 0.0331 0.0740 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table OB16. Party/Ideological Sorting and Social Group Polarization, Fixed Effect Regression 
 (1) (2) 
 Sorting Sorting 
Social Group Polarization 0.227** 
(0.0557) 
0.214** 
(0.0650) 
   
2002 -0.0169+ 
(0.00919) 
-0.0238* 
(0.0104) 
   
Pol. Interest  
 
0.0161 
(0.0314) 
   
Constant 0.240** 
(0.0267) 
0.242** 
(0.0370) 
Observations 2043 1845 
Respondents 1117 1074 
R2_Within 0.0469 0.0493 
R2_Between 0.294 0.274 
R2_Overall 0.194 0.202 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Appendix C 
 
 In this Appendix we investigate the consequences of restricting the group dimension factor 
analyses to a ‘common’ core of social groups across the various Time Series or Panel Waves.  
 
Time Series 
The analyses in in-text rely on models that include a panoply of social group feeling thermometers. 
One question may be whether the increasing polarization on display is the result of momentarily salient 
social groups. To explore this possibility we have investigated models wherein we restrict the group 
dimension to ‘common’ social groups.  
 
The results from our first attempt at this process are presented in Figure OC1-OC3. Our models 
here attempt to strike a balance between restricting the models to common groups while maintaining a 
good deal of coverage across relevant groups. This involves two compromises. First, between the years of 
1980 and 2012 the ANES consistently asked respondents about these groups: Blacks, whites, big business, 
labor unions, liberals, conservatives, the military, Hispanics, people on welfare, and poor people. However, 
the ANES also asked respondents during this time frame to record their evaluation either of Christian 
Fundamentalists or Evangelicals and either between Feminists and the Women’s Movement. These two 
attitude objects are not interchangeable, but they do load on the same dimensions (i.e. the Republican 
Groups dimension in the former case or the Democrats in the latter case) and are thematically quite similar. 
Thus, for our initial analyses we maintain these groups within the model. Second, the 2016 ANES Time 
Series asks about the foregoing groups but leaves off the military and people on welfare. For this initial 
analysis we do not omit these two groups form the 1980-2012 analyses. The key difference, as Figure OC1-
OC3 show, concerns evaluations of the Republican Groups dimension where evaluations are generally more 
positive (negative) among Republicans (Democrats) when we restrict our attention to these ‘core’ groups. 
This is perhaps not surprising given that whites and the military may serve as societal reference groups for 
many people, even if associated with the Republican Party, and thus earn broadly positive evaluations. The 
results is greater initial polarization in the [mostly] common items analyses that nevertheless slopes 
upwards over time.  
 
One obvious drawback to the above process is that we are not quite comparing apples to apples. 
While Feminists and the Women’s Movement likely both tap into similar affective responses among 
respondents, they are of course not quite the same; the same can be said for Evangelicals and Christian 
Fundamentalists. Moreover, we cannot easily go from the 1980-2012 to 2016 time points due to the 
further dropping of social groups in this last year. We have thus refit our models focused only on those 
groups common to the entire 1980-2016 time frame: liberals, Blacks, Unions, Conservatives, Whites, Big 
Business, the Poor, and Hispanics. However, we should note that we are still not quite comparing apples to 
apples in these analyses at least when comparing against the original model results below. To quote the 
STATA guide to structural equation modeling, “it can be devilishly difficult for software to obtain results for 
SEMs,” and this was true in this case. In particular, cutting the group models back so far led to convergence 
issues in several cases in the 1980-2012 sample, issues that we could only circumscribe by restricting some 
thermometers to not load on the substantive dimension it loaded on in the original analyses. This 
frequently involved the Hispanics and Poor thermometers and particularly so in the 1980s analyses. One 
likely reason for these groups to stand out is that they loaded rather weakly on the group dimension in 
question (Democratic Groups) to begin with.  Regardless, we provide a comparison between the original 
models, presented in text, and these restricted models in Figures OC4-OC7. We see a similar pattern of 
results as in Figures OC1-OC3; affect toward the Republican group dimension is more polarized to begin 
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with in the common items models than in the in-text models, albeit again with a growing degree of group 
polarization, albeit one that is more uneven in the common groups models shown in Figure OC7.  
 
What does these results tell us? First, we can still detect polarization in affect toward the parties 
group coalitions even when restricting our attention to a small number of groups likely to lie close to the 
center of the party’s group coalitions. Second, polarization in affect toward these groups still appears to 
have increased over time, albeit in a less even way. However, this ‘unevenness’ is, to us, likely a remnant of 
omitting social groups that are likely key to how partisans view the parties, i.e. gender groups such as 
Feminists and religious groups such as Christian Fundamentalists (e.g., Ahler and Sood n.d.).  
 
 
Panel 
 
 The panel analyses in text also use group dimensions that vary in their group inputs. Here, 
we compare our original model results to (1) results from analyses wherein the group dimensions are 
restricted only to those groups common to all three waves within a panel survey (i.e. 1992 & 1994 & 1996) 
and (2) to analyses where the group dimensions are composed of evaluations of groups common to all six 
surveys across the two panels. These results are presented in Tables OC1-OC3. Importantly, we continue to 
see the same patterns as before; while the coefficients jump around, social group polarization continues to 
influence later partisan affective polarization, PID strength, and party/ideological sorting even when social 
group polarization is measured via these restricted models.   
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Figure OC1: Evaluation of Groups by Democrats, Original Model and [Mostly] ‘Common’ Groups 
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Figure OC2: Evaluation of Groups by Republicans, Original Model and [Mostly] ‘Common’ Groups 
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Figure OC3: Social Group Polarization, Original Model and [Mostly] ‘Common’ Groups 
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Figure OC4: Democrats Ratings of Group Coalitions, Original Model vs. Only Common 
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Figure OC5: Republican Ratings of Group Coalitions, Original Model vs. Only Common 
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Figure OC6: In and Out Group Ratings of Group Coalitions, Original Model vs. Only Common 
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Figure OC7:  Social Group Polarization, Original Model vs. Only Common 
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Table OC1. Overview of Results From Original Models, Restricting to Social Groups Common Within Panels, 
and Common on All Six Panels: Party Polarization & Social Group Polarization 
 1992-1994-1996 
 Original Common to All three 
Panels 
Common to All Six Panels 
Cross-Lag Coefficient    
T1 SGP -> T2 Party 0.161** 
(0.0417) 
0.136** 
(0.0434) 
0.136** 
(0.0463) 
    
T2 SGP -> T3 Party 0.251** 
(0.0659) 
0.242** 
(0.0650) 
0.208** 
(0.0633) 
    
T1 Party -> T2 SGP 0.0504+ 
(0.0290) 
0.0483 
(0.0295) 
0.0693* 
(0.0327) 
    
T2 Party -> T3 SGP  0.118* 
(0.0490) 
0.148** 
(0.0410) 
0.183** 
(0.0449) 
    
N =  425 425 425 
    
Wald Tests    
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 
-> (SGPt2) 
p < 0.05 p = 0.111 p = 0.265 
    
(SGPt2 -> Partyt3) = (Partyt2 
-> (SGPt3) 
p = 0.119 p = 0.242 p = 0.763 
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Table OC2. Overview of Results From Original Models, Restricting to Social Groups Common Within Panels, 
and Common on All Six Panels: PID Strength & Social Group Polarization 
 
 1992-1994-1996 2000-2002-2004  
 Original All Three All Six Original All Three All Six 
Cross-Lag 
Coefficient 
      
T1 SGP -> T2 
Party 
0.212* 
(0.0833) 
0.172* 
(0.0861) 
0.181* 
(0.0919) 
0.0795 
(0.0715) 
0.0809 
(0.0678) 
0.180* 
(0.0721) 
       
T2 SGP -> T3 
Party 
0.195* 
(0.0908) 
0.190* 
(0.0893) 
0.214* 
(0.0858) 
0.124* 
(0.0616) 
0.129* 
(0.0607) 
0.139* 
(0.0649) 
       
T1 Party -> T2 
SGP 
0.00394 
(0.0113) 
0.00180 
(0.0115) 
0.00781 
(0.0128) 
0.0343** 
(0.0115) 
0.0314** 
(0.0114) 
0.0254* 
(0.0111) 
       
T2 Party -> T3 
SGP  
0.0273 
(0.0206) 
0.0387* 
(0.0173) 
0.0523** 
(0.0188) 
-0.00602 
(0.0184) 
0.00695 
(0.0177) 
0.0208 
(0.0193) 
       
N =  425 425 425 621 621 621 
       
Wald Tests       
(SGPt1 -> 
Partyt2) = 
(Partyt1 -> 
(SGPt2) 
p < 0.10 p < 0.10 p < 0.10 p = 0.53 p = 0.473 p < 0.05 
       
(SGPt2 -> 
Partyt3) = 
(Partyt2 -> 
(SGPt3) 
p < 0.05 p < 0.10 p < 0.10 p < 0.05 p < 0.10 p = 0.10 
 
 
56 
 
Table OC3. Overview of Results From Original Models, Restricting to Social Groups Common Within Panels, 
and Common on All Six Panels: Party Ideological Sorting & Social Group Polarization 
 1992-1994-1996 2000-2002  
 Original  All 3 All Six PID Strength All Three All Six 
Cross-Lag 
Coefficient 
      
T1 SGP -> T2 
Party 
0.378** 
(0.0677) 
0.353** 
(0.0706) 
0.370** 
(0.0760) 
0.280** 
(0.0575) 
0.321** 
(0.0556) 
0.387** 
(0.0583) 
       
T2 SGP -> T3 
Party 
0.309** 
(0.0730) 
0.322** 
(0.0718) 
0.319** 
(0.0687) 
N/A N/A N/A 
       
T1 Party -> T2 
SGP 
0.0847** 
(0.0225) 
0.0796** 
(0.0233) 
0.108** 
(0.0262) 
0.117** 
(0.0159) 
0.0995** 
(0.0160) 
0.0819** 
(0.0159) 
       
T2 Party -> T3 
SGP  
0.100** 
(0.0283) 
0.121** 
(0.0237) 
0.163** 
(0.0254) 
N/A N/A N/A 
       
N =  425 425 425 831 831 831 
       
Wald Tests       
(SGPt1 -> 
Partyt2) = 
(Partyt1 -> 
(SGPt2) 
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.05 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p  <0.01 
       
(SGPt2 -> 
Partyt3) = 
(Partyt2 -> 
(SGPt3) 
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 N/A N/A N/A 
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Appendix D 
 
 One potential questions concerns identification and, in particular, the role of the individual’s 
own identifications in affecting social group polarization, party polarization (etc.), and their inter-
relationship. In the models reported in text we include gender and race as control variables. In the models 
described in this appendix we also add religious preference (Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Other [Base: 
None]). These items capture one element of identification (membership) but not another (psychological 
attachment). Unfortunately the ANES does not contain the type of identity measures for social groups that 
have grown in acceptance due to the work of Mason, Huddy, Greene and others drawing upon the social 
identity framework (e.g. Bankert, Huddy, and Rosema n.d.; Greene 2002; Huddy and Khatib 2007; Huddy, 
Mason, and Aarøe 2015). So, we are limited in our ability to speak to the role of group identification in this 
broader story.5  
However, respondents in both panels were asked to indicate which social groups they felt “close” 
to in 1992 and 2000 with the list of groups asked about partially overlapping with the social groups in the 
feeling thermometer battery. One potential solution is to leverage these items to address the potential role 
of identification. However, there are some drawbacks to such an approach. In particular, these “close to” 
items are not an ideal measure of identification as individuals may report feeling ‘close to’ a group for 
reasons other than membership + a psychological attachment. For instance, 22.5% of male respondents on 
the ANES reported feeling close to “women”. “Closeness”, moreover, may reference feelings of shared 
interests but not necessarily indicate that the individual has incorporated the group into their broader self-
concept, so even in the case where this item overlaps with group membership it may be the case that 
group identification is not being precisely addressed. Regardless we investigate how their inclusion as 
control variables affects the panel analyses in a new appendix, Online Appendix D. 
We use these items in two ways; Tables OD1-OD5 provide an overview of the cross-lagged results 
from our original models and in these two alternative models.  
 First, we simply add each of these binary items (1 = close, 0 = not close) as control variables; this 
does not affect the relationship between the thermometer-based group affective dimension and the 
outcome variables save for the 2000-2004 PID Strength analyses where the coefficient turns for social 
group polarization turns insignificant (see below).  Second, we create a similar differenced measured from 
these “close to” items to include as a control. We first take the mean of all of the “close to” groups typically 
related to the Democratic Party and then again those typically associated with the Republican Party; we use 
a mean here because there are more groups in this battery traditionally linked to the Democrats than the 
Republicans.6 Then, much as with the thermometer based measure, we sort this by respondent 
partisanship into In-Party Group Closeness and Out-Party Group Closeness and take the difference between 
the items such that higher scores indicate greater ‘closeness’ to groups associated with one’s in-party. This 
resulting difference measure is positively correlated with the latent affective dimension formed from the 
CFA (r = 0.40 [1992]; r = 0.22 [2000]). We see three key results from its inclusion as a control variable in the 
panel analyses: (1) the measure does not significantly predict later levels of social group polarization; (2) it 
                                                          
5 As a side note, insofar as group identities influence T1 values in social group polarization and our other outcome 
variables, then the lagged values of these variables should capture some of the effects of identification. 
6 Democratic Groups in the 92-96 Panel: Poor, liberals, Blacks, Unions, Feminists, Hispanics, Women, Working Class, 
and Asians. Republican Groups in this panel: Southerners, Business People, Conservatives, and Whites. Democratic 
groups in the 00-04 Panel: Poor, Asians, Liberals, Blacks, Unions, Feminists, Hispanics, and Women. Republican 
Groups were: Whites, Southerners, Business People, and Conservatives.   
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does predict later levels of the three party variables (particularly the party sorting measure), and (3) it does 
not significantly alter the relationship between social group polarization and our outcome variables in the 
1992-1996 analyses or on the sorting analyses in the 2000-2002 panel, but does lead to an insignificant 
social group thermometer coefficient in the 2000-2002-2004 PID strength analyses. Notably, in these last 
analyses this differenced item is a substantial predictor of later PID strength.  
As we note, these items are not very well suited for investigating identity or identification, but they 
may be the closest such measure for identification with social identities beyond partisanship in the ANES. 
Ultimately, we are heartened to see them have a similar influence on the later party variables as we believe 
this provides further evidence of a group-based dimension to party polarization, whether they are tapping 
identification or serve as an alternative measurement of group polarization.  
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Table OD1. Overview of Results From Original Models, Models Controlling for Individual Group Closeness 
Items, and Group Closeness ‘Differenced’ Items [Party Affective Polarization, 1992-1996 ANES Panel] 
 
 1992-1994-1996 
 Original Group Closeness Group Closeness: 
Differenced 
Cross-Lag Coefficient    
T1 SGP -> T2 Party 0.161** 
(0.0417) 
0.138** 
(0.0425) 
0.235** 
(0.0662) 
    
T2 SGP -> T3 Party 0.251** 
(0.0659) 
0.252** 
(0.0659) 
0.174** 
(0.0436) 
    
T1 Party -> T2 SGP 0.0504+ 
(0.0290) 
0.0584+ 
(0.0302) 
0.0519+ 
(0.0294) 
    
T2 Party -> T3 SGP  0.118* 
(0.0490) 
0.140** 
(0.0488) 
0.127** 
(0.0489) 
    
T1 Group Difference -> T2 
SGP 
  -0.00420 
(0.0280) 
    
T1 Group Difference -> T3 
SGP 
  0.0307 
(0.0310) 
    
T1 Group Difference -> T2 
Party 
  0.117** 
(0.0378) 
    
T1 Group Difference -> T2 
Party 
  -0.0139 
(0.0326) 
    
N =  425 422 422 
    
Wald Tests    
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 
-> (SGPt2) 
p < 0.05 p = 0.147 p < 0.03 
    
(SGPt2 -> Partyt3) = (Partyt2 
-> (SGPt3) 
p = 0.119 p = 0.191 p = 0.207 
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Table OD2. Overview of Results From Original Models, Models Controlling for Individual Group Closeness 
Items, and Group Closeness ‘Differenced’ Items [PID Strength, 1992-1996 ANES Panel] 
 
 1992-1994-1996 
 Original Common to All three 
Panels 
Common to All Six Panels 
Cross-Lag Coefficient    
T1 SGP -> T2 Party 0.212* 
(0.0833) 
0.209* 
(0.0860) 
0.226* 
(0.0878) 
    
T2 SGP -> T3 Party 0.195* 
(0.0908) 
0.161+ 
(0.0924) 
0.163+ 
(0.0923) 
    
T1 Party -> T2 SGP 0.00394 
(0.0113) 
0.00682 
(0.0113) 
0.00593 
(0.0114) 
    
T2 Party -> T3 SGP  0.0273 
(0.0206) 
0.0341+ 
(0.0205) 
0.0279 
(0.0206) 
    
T1 Group Difference -> T2 
SGP 
  0.00236 
(0.0278) 
    
T1 Group Difference -> T3 
SGP 
  0.0317 
(0.0312) 
    
T1 Group Difference -> T2 
Party 
  0.0169 
(0.0670) 
    
T1 Group Difference -> T2 
Party 
  0.142* 
(0.0583) 
    
N =  425 422 422 
    
Wald Tests    
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 
-> (SGPt2) 
p < 0.10 p = 0.181 p = 0.154 
    
(SGPt2 -> Partyt3) = (Partyt2 
-> (SGPt3) 
p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 
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Table OD3. Overview of Results From Original Models, Models Controlling for Individual Group Closeness 
Items, and Group Closeness ‘Differenced’ Items [Party/Ideological Sorting, 1992-1996 ANES Panel] 
 
 1992-1994-1996 
 Original Common to All three 
Panels 
Common to All Six Panels 
Cross-Lag Coefficient    
T1 SGP -> T2 Party 0.378** 
(0.0677) 
0.340** 
(0.0688) 
0.339** 
(0.0704) 
    
T2 SGP -> T3 Party 0.309** 
(0.0730) 
0.258** 
(0.0728) 
0.263** 
(0.0746) 
    
T1 Party -> T2 SGP 0.0847** 
(0.0225) 
0.0848** 
(0.0230) 
0.0349 
(0.0331) 
    
T2 Party -> T3 SGP  0.100** 
(0.0283) 
0.104** 
(0.0286) 
0.0939** 
(0.0298) 
    
T1 Group Difference -> T2 
SGP 
  0.000952 
(0.0278) 
    
T1 Group Difference -> T3 
SGP 
  0.0177 
(0.0313) 
    
T1 Group Difference -> T2 
Party 
  0.133* 
(0.0531) 
    
T1 Group Difference -> T2 
Party 
  0.0964* 
(0.0442) 
    
N =  425 422 422 
    
Wald Tests    
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 
-> (SGPt2) 
p < 0.01 p < 0.10 p < 0.05 
    
(SGPt2 -> Partyt3) = (Partyt2 
-> (SGPt3) 
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
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Table OD4. Overview of Results From Original Models, Models Controlling for Individual Group Closeness 
Items, and Group Closeness ‘Differenced’ Items [PID Strength, 2000-2004 ANES Panel] 
 2000-2002-2004 
 Original Common to All three 
Panels 
Common to All Six Panels 
Cross-Lag Coefficient    
T1 SGP -> T2 Party 0.0795 
(0.0715) 
0.118 
(0.0827) 
0.0313 
(0.0817) 
    
T2 SGP -> T3 Party 0.124* 
(0.0616) 
0.0651 
(0.0695) 
0.101 
(0.0672) 
    
T1 Party -> T2 SGP 0.0343** 
(0.0115) 
0.0405** 
(0.0131) 
0.0432** 
(0.0124) 
    
T2 Party -> T3 SGP  -0.00602 
(0.0184) 
0.00738 
(0.0195) 
-0.00451 
(0.0191) 
    
T1 Group Difference -> T2 
SGP 
  -0.00221 
(0.169) 
    
T1 Group Difference -> T3 
SGP 
  0.198 
(0.158) 
    
T1 Group Difference -> T2 
Party 
  0.714* 
(0.303) 
    
T1 Group Difference -> T2 
Party 
  -0.0566 
(0.288) 
 
    
N =  621 517 547 
    
Wald Tests    
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 
-> (SGPt2) 
p = 0.53 p = 0.356 p = 0.885 
    
(SGPt2 -> Partyt3) = (Partyt2 
-> (SGPt3) 
p < 0.05 p = 0.429 p = 0.136 
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Table OD4. Overview of Results From Original Models, Models Controlling for Individual Group Closeness 
Items, and Group Closeness ‘Differenced’ Items [Sorting, 2000-2002 ANES Panel] 
 
 
 
 Original Common to All three 
Panels 
Common to All Six Panels 
Cross-Lag Coefficient    
T1 SGP -> T2 Party 0.280** 
(0.0575) 
0.337** 
(0.0665) 
0.285** 
(0.0654) 
    
T1 Party -> T2 SGP 0.117** 
(0.0159) 
0.126** 
(0.0176) 
0.155** 
(0.0242) 
    
T1 Group Difference -> T2 
SGP 
  0.927** 
(0.247) 
    
T1 Group Difference -> T2 
Party 
  0.927** 
(0.247) 
    
    
N =  831 688 723 
    
Wald Tests    
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 
-> (SGPt2) 
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.10 
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Appendix E 
Racial groups are a key element in perceptions of political parties and in recent accounts of partisan 
antipathy (e.g., Abramowitz and Webster 2018; Ahler and Sood n.d.; Mason 2016). How does the inclusion 
of racial groups within our group coalition measurement analyses influence our subsequent results? In this 
Appendix we replicate our in-text analyses after excluding racial groups from the construction of the group 
coalition latent dimensions.7 
Figures OE1-OE4 provide a comparison of our Time Series results between the in-text models and 
the ones excluding racial groups. There is one notable deviance that shows up in 2016 and, to a lesser 
extent, in 2008. In these years, Democratic (Republican) respondents record less positive (negative) 
evaluations on the Democratic Groups dimension. Scores on the Republican Groups dimension are virtually 
unaffected. This does not yield a change in the overall level of group polarization in 2008 but does yield less 
polarization in 2016. These changes are perhaps not entirely surprising given the relationship between 
Presidents Obama and Trump and the racialization of party conflict (e.g., Piston 2010; Schaffner, 
MacWilliams, and Nteta 2018; Tesler 2013). On the whole, though, the patterns in the Time Series analyses 
are highly consistent regardless of whether the racial groups are omitted or not. 
Tables OE1-OE5, meanwhile, provide an overview of results comparing the estimates of the 
relationship between T SGP and T+1 Party Variables, and the reciprocal relationships, between the original 
models and those based on group dimensions expunged of racial groups. Omitting the racial groups from 
the groups dimension does not materially influence our conclusions.  
Back to Title/Contents Page 
 
  
 
 
  
                                                          
7 This requires removing the following thermometers: Blacks, Civil Rights Leaders, Black Militants, Hispanics, Asians, 
Whites, Illegal Immigrants, Immigrants, and Blacks Lives Matter 
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Figure OE1: Comparing Results Across Models, Democratic Respondents 
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Figure OE2: Comparing Results Across Models, Republican Respondents 
 
 
 
  
67 
 
Figure OE3: Comparing Results Across Models, In- and Out-Groups 
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Figure OE4:  Comparing Results Across Models, Social Group Polarization 
 
 
 
 
  
69 
 
Table OE1. Overview of Results From Original Models and Models Excluding Racial Groups from Group 
Dimensions [Party Affective Polarization, 1992-1996 ANES Panel] 
   
 Original Excluding Racial Groups 
Cross-Lag Coefficient   
T1 SGP -> T2 Party 0.161** 
(0.0417) 
0.158** 
(0.0441) 
   
T2 SGP -> T3 Party 0.251** 
(0.0659) 
0.245** 
(0.0640) 
   
T1 Party -> T2 SGP 0.0504+ 
(0.0290) 
0.0413 
(0.0294) 
   
T2 Party -> T3 SGP  0.118* 
(0.0490) 
0.143** 
(0.0399) 
   
   
N =  425 425 
   
Wald Tests   
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 -> 
(SGPt2) 
p < 0.05 p < 0.05 
   
(SGPt2 -> Partyt3) = (Partyt2 -> 
(SGPt3) 
p = 0.119 p = 0.194 
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Table OE2. Overview of Results From Original Models and Models Excluding Racial Groups from Group 
Dimensions [PID Strength, 1992-1996 ANES Panel] 
   
 Original Excluding Racial Groups 
Cross-Lag Coefficient   
T1 SGP -> T2 Party 0.212* 
(0.0833) 
0.217* 
(0.0876) 
   
T2 SGP -> T3 Party 0.195* 
(0.0908) 
0.187* 
(0.0884) 
   
T1 Party -> T2 SGP 0.00394 
(0.0113) 
0.00454 
(0.0114) 
   
T2 Party -> T3 SGP  0.0273 
(0.0206) 
0.0356* 
(0.0169) 
   
   
N =  425 425 
   
Wald Tests   
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 -> 
(SGPt2) 
p < 0.10 p < 0.10 
   
(SGPt2 -> Partyt3) = (Partyt2 -> 
(SGPt3) 
p < 0.05 p < 0.05 
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Table OE3. Overview of Results From Original Models and Models Excluding Racial Groups from Group 
Dimensions [Party/Ideological Sorting, 1992-1996 ANES Panel] 
 
   
 Original Excluding Racial Groups 
Cross-Lag Coefficient   
T1 SGP -> T2 Party 0.378** 
(0.0677) 
0.381** 
(0.0705) 
   
T2 SGP -> T3 Party 0.309** 
(0.0730) 
0.315** 
(0.0709) 
   
T1 Party -> T2 SGP 0.0847** 
(0.0225) 
0.0787** 
(0.0230) 
   
T2 Party -> T3 SGP  0.100** 
(0.0283) 
0.118** 
(0.0231) 
   
   
N =  425 425 
   
Wald Tests   
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 -> 
(SGPt2) 
p < 0.01 p < 0.05 
   
(SGPt2 -> Partyt3) = (Partyt2 -> 
(SGPt3) 
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
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Table OE4. Overview of Results From Original Models and Models Excluding Racial Groups from Group 
Dimensions [PID Strength, 2000-2004 ANES Panel] 
   
 Original Excluding Racial Groups 
Cross-Lag Coefficient   
T1 SGP -> T2 Party 0.0795 
(0.0715) 
0.0764 
(0.0703) 
   
T2 SGP -> T3 Party 0.124* 
(0.0616) 
0.136* 
(0.0604) 
   
T1 Party -> T2 SGP 0.0343** 
(0.0115) 
0.0354** 
(0.0119) 
   
T2 Party -> T3 SGP  -0.00602 
(0.0184) 
-0.00244 
(0.0182) 
   
N =  621 621 
   
Wald Tests   
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 -> 
(SGPt2) 
p = 0.53 p = 0.57 
   
(SGPt2 -> Partyt3) = (Partyt2 -> 
(SGPt3) 
p < 0.05 p < 0.03 
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Table OE5. Overview of Results From Original Models and Models Excluding Racial Groups from Group 
Dimensions [Sorting, 2000-2002 ANES Panel] 
 
 
 
 Original Excluding Racial Groups 
Cross-Lag Coefficient   
T1 SGP -> T2 Party 0.280** 
(0.0575) 
0.273** 
(0.0565) 
   
T1 Party -> T2 SGP 0.117** 
(0.0159) 
0.124** 
(0.0163) 
   
N =  831 831 
   
Wald Tests   
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 -> 
(SGPt2) 
p < 0.01 p < 0.05 
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Appendix F 
 
One question that may arise is the role of more or less ideological groups in driving the results we see in 
text. One potential suspicion is that the less ideological groups are driving our patterns as they get folded 
into the mix over time. Alternatively, it may be the more ideological groups that are at fault. A robustness 
check we investigate in this appendix involves the omission of ‘ideological groups’. However, this raises the 
question of which groups to omit. While liberals and conservatives are perhaps clearly ‘ideological’, it is less 
clear with regards to many of the other groups that we could look at. Indeed, we think it is plausible that 
many individuals assign ideological meaning to many other groups in the data that are not explicitly 
ideological. A novel study by Swigger (2012), for instance, shows that candidate advertisements randomly 
featuring visual images of African Americans, senior citizens, blue collar workers, Latinos, or soldiers (e.g. 
the military) substantially influenced subjects subsequent ideological and issue placement of the candidate 
involved (see also: Brady and Sniderman 1985). While they do not explore perceptions of candidate 
ideology per se, Campbell, Green, and Layman’s (2011) shows that cueing an Evangelical identity with 
regards to a candidate substantially influences how partisans respond to the candidate. We’re hesitant 
then to draw clear lines in the sand with groups other than liberals and conservatives. We thus simply 
replicate our intext results by re-estimating the group dimensions absent liberals and conservatives.  
Figures OF1-OF4 compare our original model results to these replications. The key difference that emerges 
concerns evaluations of the Democratic group coalition, with less positive evaluations emerging among 
Democratic respondents when we omit liberals from the mix and more positive (or, less negative) 
evaluations for Republicans. Polarization still exists but it now grows more slowly until 2012 where we see a 
dramatic upsurge in antipathy. Tables OF1-OF3, meanwhile, focus on the panel results; here we see little 
change in the partisan affective polarization models but some reduced precision in the PID strength and 
party/ideological sorting models.  
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Figure OF1: Democrats Ratings of Democratic & Republican Group Dimensions – Original Models vs. Those 
Without Liberals and Conservatives 
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Figure OF2: Republicans Ratings of Democratic & Republican Group Dimensions – Original Models vs. Those 
Without Liberals and Conservatives 
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Figure OF3: In Groups and Out Groups Group Dimensions – Original Models vs. Those Without Liberals and 
Conservatives 
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Figure OF4: Social Group Polarization – Original Models vs. Those Without Liberals and Conservatives 
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Table OF1. Comparison of Results: Original Models to Those Excluding Liberals and Conservatives From 
Group Dimension [Partisan Affective Polarization, 1992-1994-1996 ANES Panel] 
 
 1992-1994-1996  
 Original Excl. Ideological Groups 
Cross-Lag Coefficient   
T1 SGP -> T2 Party 0.161** 
(0.0417) 
0.157** 
(0.0379) 
   
T2 SGP -> T3 Party 0.251** 
(0.0659) 
0.233** 
(0.0576) 
   
T1 Party -> T2 SGP 0.0504+ 
(0.0290) 
0.0417 
(0.0315) 
   
T2 Party -> T3 SGP  0.118* 
(0.0490) 
0.172** 
(0.0510) 
   
N =  425 425 
   
Wald Tests   
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 
-> (SGPt2) 
p < 0.05 p < 0.05 
   
(SGPt2 -> Partyt3) = (Partyt2 
-> (SGPt3) 
p = 0.119 p < 0.438 
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Table OF2. Comparison of Results: Original Models to Those Excluding Liberals and Conservatives From 
Group Dimension [PID Strength] 
 1992-1994-1996  2000-2002-2004  
 Original Excluding 
Ideological Groups 
Original Excluding 
Ideological Groups 
Cross-Lag 
Coefficient 
    
T1 SGP -> T2 Party 0.161** 
(0.0417) 
0.181* 
(0.0774) 
0.0795 
(0.0715) 
0.0243 
(0.0707) 
     
T2 SGP -> T3 Party 0.251** 
(0.0659) 
0.134 
(0.0853) 
0.124* 
(0.0616) 
0.122 
(0.0773) 
     
T1 Party -> T2 SGP 0.0504+ 
(0.0290) 
0.0119 
(0.0125) 
0.0343** 
(0.0115) 
0.0138 
(0.00933) 
     
T2 Party -> T3 SGP  0.118* 
(0.0490) 
0.00531 
(0.0231) 
-0.00602 
(0.0184) 
-0.00989 
(0.0170) 
     
N =  425 425 621 621 
     
Wald Tests     
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = 
(Partyt1 -> (SGPt2) 
p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p = 0.53 p = 0.883 
     
(SGPt2 -> Partyt3) = 
(Partyt2 -> (SGPt3) 
p = 0.119 p = 0.146 p < 0.05 p < 0.10 
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Table OF3. Comparison of Results: Original Models to Those Excluding Liberals and Conservatives From 
Group Dimension [Party/Ideological Sorting] 
 
 1992-1994-1996  2000-2002   
 Original  Excl. Ideol Groups Original Excl. Ideol Groups 
Cross-Lag 
Coefficient 
    
T1 SGP -> T2 Party 0.378** 
(0.0677) 
0.321** 
(0.0628) 
0.280** 
(0.0575) 
0.208** 
(0.0571) 
     
T2 SGP -> T3 Party 0.309** 
(0.0730) 
0.124+ 
(0.0678) 
N/A N/A 
     
T1 Party -> T2 SGP 0.0847** 
(0.0225) 
0.0318 
(0.0241) 
0.117** 
(0.0159) 
0.0443** 
(0.0124) 
     
T2 Party -> T3 SGP  0.100** 
(0.0283) 
0.118** 
(0.0299) 
N/A N/A 
     
N =  425 425 831 831 
     
Wald Tests     
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = 
(Partyt1 -> (SGPt2) 
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
     
(SGPt2 -> Partyt3) = 
(Partyt2 -> (SGPt3) 
p < 0.01 p = 0.936 N/A N/A 
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Appendix G 
Feeling group thermometer ratings contain measurement error, particularly due to differences in how 
individuals use the thermometer scale points (Wilcox and Cook 1989). We follow prior work in accounting 
for this error by fitting a thermometer measurement dimension on which all the thermometer load equally 
and which is uncorrelated with our more substantive dimensions (Weisberg, Haynes, and Krosnick 1995). 
However, in a recent article Highton and Kam (2011) also take this approach to dealing with error in the 
thermometers, but they allow the thermometers to load ‘freely’, e.g. not constrained to equality, on the 
thermometer dimension. In this appendix we investigate the importance of this choice. We see two key 
results from the analyses reported below. First, the models wherein the thermometers are allowed to load 
freely on the measurement dimension possess superior fit to those that use a fixed loading. Second, this 
difference does not influence our subsequent results; the factor scores that emerge from the ‘free’ loading 
analyses are highly correlated with those that emerged from the fixed analyses and vary by trivial margins.  
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Table OG1. 1980 CFA Results (Standardized Loadings) 
 Democratic Dimension Republican Dimension 
 Fixed Loadings on 
Measurement 
Free Loadings on 
Measurement 
Fixed Loadings on 
Measurement 
Free Loadings 
on 
Measurement 
Liberals 0.43 0.47   
Blacks 0.20 0.23   
Civil Rights Leaders 0.59 0.62   
Black Militants 0.59 0.63   
Ppl. On Welfare 0.31 0.33   
     
Unions 0.32 0.34   
Women’s Movement 0.39 0.40   
Hispanics 0.11 0.13   
Environmentalists 0.11 0.14   
     
Conservatives   0.33 0.41 
Whites   0.48 0.41 
Big Business   0.02 0.06 
Businessmen   0.53 0.47 
Military   0.28 0.28 
Southerners   0.19 0.18 
Workingmen   0.45 0.37 
Middleclass   0.60 0.54 
     
Fit Statistics Fixed Free   
RMSEA 0.095 0.085   
CFI 0.790 0.849   
Χ2 (p-value) 2645.867 (0.000) 1925.311 (0.000)   
Χ2/df 15.56 12.67   
Stand. Root Square 
Mean Residual 
0.098 0.051   
     
Correlations     
Dem Groups (Fixed) 1    
Dem (Free) 0.99 1   
Rep (Fixed) -0.97 -0.95 1  
Rep (Free) -0.98 -0.98 0.99 1 
Dem. Party 0.29 0.32 -0.27 -0.32 
Rep. Party -0.26 -0.26 0.24 0.26 
PID (High = Str. Rep) -0.29 -0.31 0.27 0.31 
Ideology (High = 
Conservative) 
-0.40 -.40 0.34 0.40 
Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Poor People, Government 
Employees, and Evangelicals 
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Table OG2. 1984 CFA Results 
 Democratic Dimension Republican Dimension 
 Fixed Loadings on 
Measurement 
Free Loadings on 
Measurement 
Fixed Loadings on 
Measurement 
Free Loadings 
on 
Measurement 
Liberals 0.47 0.47   
Blacks 0.34 0.49   
Civil Rights Leaders 0.56 0.66   
Black Militants 0.67 0.54   
Unions 0.45 0.40   
Ppl. On Welfare 0.47 0.45   
Poor 0.08 0.17   
Hispanics 0.36 0.45   
Women’s Mvt 0.48 0.50   
Women 0.09 0.23   
Gays 0.64 0.56   
Conservatives    0.39 0.37 
Big Business   0.56 0.53 
Evangelical   0.68 0.69 
Anti-abortion   0.47 0.43 
Military   0.32 0.36 
     
Fit Statistics Fixed Free   
RMSEA 0.125 0.101   
CFI 0.702 0.828   
Χ2 (p-value) 5527.456 (0.000) 3237.166 (0.000)   
Χ2/df 36.36 23.97   
Stand. Root Square 
Mean Residual 
0.281 0.062   
     
Correlations     
Dem Groups (Fixed) 1    
Dem (Free) 0.70 1   
Rep (Fixed) 0.51 0.06 1  
Rep (Free) 0.11 0.09 0.78 1 
Dem. Party 0.25 0.35 -0.08 -0.08 
Rep. Party -0.21 -0.25 0.22 0.32 
PID (High = Str. Rep) -0.21 -0.27 0.14 0.18 
Ideology (High = 
Conservative) 
-0.29 -0.34 0.27 0.36 
Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Whites, Middle Class, and 
Elderly 
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Table OG3. 1988 CFA Results  
 Democratic Dimension Republican Dimension 
 Fixed Loadings on 
Measurement 
Free Loadings on 
Measurement 
Fixed Loadings on 
Measurement 
Free Loadings 
on 
Measurement 
Liberals 0.55 0.54   
Blacks 0.39 0.53   
Civil Rights Leaders 0.62 0.71   
Hispanics 0.41 0.51   
Illegal Immigrants 0.60 0.56   
Unions 0.43 0.39   
Ppl. On Welfare 0.50 0.50   
Poor 0.15 0.25   
Environmentalists 0.09 0.19   
Homosexuals 0.55 0.42   
Feminists 0.54 0.52   
Catholics 0.16 0.24   
     
Conservatives   0.24 0.25 
Big Business   0.28 0.29 
Military   0.13 0.23 
Anti-abortion   0.37 0.38 
Christian 
Fundamentalists 
  0.57 0.62 
Evangelical   0.69 0.78 
     
Fit Statistics Fixed Free   
RMSEA 0.106 0.088   
CFI 0.677 0.798   
Χ2 5044.067 3212.635   
Χ2/df 24.02 16.91   
Stand. Root Square 
Mean Residual 
0.209 0.064   
     
Correlations     
Dem Groups (Fixed) 1    
Dem (Free) 0.78 1   
Rep (Fixed) 0.47 0.23 1  
Rep (Free) 0.22 0.33 0.85 1 
Dem. Party 0.28 0.40 -0.001 0.06 
Rep. Party -0.27 -0.22 0.04 0.13 
PID (High = Str. Rep) -0.27 -0.31 0.02 0.03 
Ideology (High = 
Conservative) 
-0.32 -0.33 0.14 0.19 
Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Whites, Women, Jews, and 
the Elderly 
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Table OG5. 1992 CFA Results  
 Democratic Dimension Republican Dimension 
 Fixed Loadings on 
Measurement 
Free Loadings on 
Measurement 
Fixed Loadings on 
Measurement 
Free Loadings 
on 
Measurement 
Liberals 0.58 0.63   
Blacks 0.10 0.21   
Unions 0.36 0.40   
Hispanics 0.04 0.14   
Ppl. On Welfare 0.30 0.35   
Poor People 0.09 0.16   
Women’s Mvt 0.62 0.69   
Feminists 0.72 0.78   
Environmentalists 0.32 0.37   
Homosexuals 0.41 0.41   
Illegal Immigrants 0.24 0.25   
Lawyers 0.21 0.25   
Conservatives   0.43 0.49 
Whites   032 0.33 
Southerners   0.29 0.29 
Big Business   0.35 0.40 
Military   0.54 0.58 
Police   0.44 0.45 
Christian 
Fundamentalists 
  0.39 0.42 
Catholics   0.19 0.22 
     
Fit Statistics Fixed Free   
RMSEA 0.101 0.090   
CFI 0.729 0.803   
Χ2  6038.421 4436.136   
Χ2/df 26.25 21.23   
Stand. Root Square 
Mean Residual 
0.129 0.064   
     
Correlations     
Dem Groups (Fixed) 1    
Dem (Free) 0.93 1   
Rep (Fixed) -0.48 -0.48 1  
Rep (Free) -0.42 -0.33 0.97 1 
Dem. Party 0.38 0.44 -0.21 -0.12 
Rep. Party -0.32 -0.27 0.39 0.40 
PID (High = Str. Rep) -0.38 -0.40 0.32 0.27 
Ideology (High = 
Conservative) 
-0.46 -0.46 0.48 0.45 
Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Jews, Asians, Immigrants 
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Table OG6. 1996 CFA Results  
 Democratic Dimension Republican Dimension 
 Fixed Loadings on 
Measurement 
Free Loadings on 
Measurement 
Fixed Loadings on 
Measurement 
Free Loadings 
on 
Measurement 
Liberals 0.71 0.77   
Unions 0.39 0.41   
Blacks 0.09 0.18   
Hispanics 0.13 0.21   
Ppl. On Welfare 0.26 0.29   
Women’s Mvt 0.52 0.57   
Environmentalists 0.47 0.51   
Homosexuals 0.53 0.57   
Conservatives   0.42 0.46 
Big Business   0.20 0.22 
Military   0.21 0.22 
Christian 
Fundamentalists 
  0.70 0.73 
Christian Coalition   0.75 0.79 
     
Fit Statistics Fixed Free   
RMSEA 0.110 0.088   
CFI 0.795 0.886   
Χ2 (p-value) 2241.737 1283.775   
Χ2/df 21.55 14.26   
Stand. Root Square 
Mean Residual 
0.149 0.052   
     
Correlations     
Dem Groups (Fixed) 1    
Dem (Free) 0.94 1   
Rep (Fixed) -0.49 -0.52 1  
Rep (Free) -0.50 0.47 0.98 1 
Dem. Party 0.46 0.53 -0.22 -0.17 
Rep. Party -0.41 -0.37 0.34 0.36 
PID (High = Str. Rep) -0.47 -0.50 0.27 0.24 
Ideology (High = 
Conservative) 
-0.63 -0.62 0.48 0.47 
Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Poor People, Whites, and 
the Elderly 
 
 
  
88 
 
 
Table OG8. 2000 CFA Results   
 Democratic Dimension Republican Dimension 
 Fixed Loadings on 
Measurement 
Free Loadings on 
Measurement 
Fixed Loadings on 
Measurement 
Free Loadings 
on 
Measurement 
Liberals 0.58 0.62   
Unions 0.40 0.39   
Ppl. On Welfare 0.26 0.22   
Women’s Mvt 0.54 0.58   
Feminists 0.63 0.69   
Environmentalists 0.41 0.42   
Homosexuals 0.42 0.41   
Conservatives   0.51 0.56 
Big Business   0.38 0.37 
Military   0.32 0.36 
Christian 
Fundamentalists 
  0.66 0.70 
Christian Coalition   0.68 0.73 
Catholics   0.14 0.19 
Protestants   0.16 0.21 
Whites   0.05 0.13 
     
Fit Statistics Fixed Free   
RMSEA 0.097 0.081   
CFI 0.820 0.886   
Χ2 (p-value) 3444.447 2229.927   
Χ2/df 17.94 12.890   
Stand. Root Square 
Mean Residual 
0.184 0.049   
     
Correlations     
Dem Groups (Fixed) 1    
Dem (Free) 0.93 1   
Rep (Fixed) -0.05 -0.24 1  
Rep (Free) -0.29 -0.30 0.87 1 
Dem. Party 0.36 0.43 -0.19 -0.16 
Rep. Party -0.27 -0.27 0.31 0.39 
PID (High = Str. Rep) -0.36 -0.40 0.25 0.27 
Ideology (High = 
Conservative) 
-0.46 -0.49 0.41 0.47 
Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Blacks, Hispanics, Poor 
People, Asians, Jews, and the Elderly.  
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Table OG8. 2004 CFA Results   
 Democratic Dimension Republican Dimension 
 Fixed Loadings on 
Measurement 
Free Loadings on 
Measurement 
Fixed Loadings on 
Measurement 
Free Loadings 
on 
Measurement 
Liberals 0.65 0.70   
Unions 0.38 0.33   
Welfare 0.34 0.30   
Environmentalists 0.45 0.48   
Homosexuals 0.52 0.52   
Illegal Immigrants 0.50 0.45   
Feminists 0.59 0.62   
Muslims 0.40 0.39   
Blacks 0.07 0.14   
Poor 0.05 0.08   
Asians 0.12 0.15   
     
Conservatives   0.55 0.61 
Whites   0.10 0.14 
Southerners   0.20 0.22 
Big Business   0.57 0.59 
Business   0.38 0.40 
Military   0.33 0.36 
Christian 
Fundamentalists 
  0.50 0.52 
Men   0.16 0.17 
Rich   0.38 0.38 
Catholic Church   0.39 0.39 
Catholics   0.27 0.29 
Middle Class   0.04 0.07 
     
Fit Statistics Fixed Free   
RMSEA 0.092 0.084   
CFI 0.791 0.837   
Χ2 (p-value) 4261.547 3388.242   
Χ2/df 11.21 9.60   
Stand. Root Square 
Mean Residual 
0.173 0.056   
     
Correlations     
Dem Groups (Fixed) 1    
Dem (Free) 0.85 1   
Rep (Fixed) -0.12 -0.37 1  
Rep (Free) -0.36 -0.43 0.93 1 
Dem. Party 0.35 0.45 -0.24 -0.26 
Rep. Party -0.39 -0.39 0.44 0.52 
PID (High = Str. Rep) -0.41 -0.46 0.36 0.41 
Ideology (High = 
Conservative) 
-0.51 -0.53 0.48 0.55 
Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension:. Working Class, Women,  
Jews, Hispanics, Elderly, and the Young 
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Table OG9. 2008 CFA Results   
 Democratic Dimension Republican Dimension 
 Fixed Loadings on 
Measurement 
Free Loadings on 
Measurement 
Fixed Loadings on 
Measurement 
Free Loadings 
on 
Measurement 
Liberals 0.40 0.50   
Unions 0.17 0.27   
Ppl. On Welfare 0.15 0.29   
Blacks 0.02 0.25   
Hispanics 0.17 0.38   
Asians 0.13 0.34   
Jews 0.06 0.26   
Feminists 0.31 0.42   
Environmentalists 0.23 0.35   
Homosexuals 0.53 0.59   
Illegal Immigrants 0.42 0.51   
Muslims 0.52 0.66   
Hindus 0.45 0.60   
Atheists 0.55 0.58   
Conservatives   0.27 0.51 
Southerners   0.25 0.15 
Big Business   0.12 0.38 
Military   0.38 0.24 
Christian 
Fundamentalists 
  0.33 0.52 
Christians   0.45 0.23 
Catholics   0.11 0.09 
Rich   0.05 0.24 
Middle Class   0.18 -0.04 
     
Fit Statistics Fixed Free   
RMSEA 0.089 0.077   
CFI 0.794 0.858   
Χ2 (p-value) 4833.402 3400.499   
Χ2/df 19.33   14.91   
Stand. Root Square 
Mean Residual 
0.101 0.054   
     
Correlations     
Dem Groups (Fixed) 1    
Dem (Free) 0.85 1   
Rep (Fixed) -0.99 -0.84 1  
Rep (Free) -0.55 -0.35 0.58 1 
Dem. Party 0.21 0.29 -0.22 -0.20 
Rep. Party -0.28 -0.21 0.28 0.38 
PID (High = Str. Rep) -0.28 -0.30 0.28 0.29 
Ideology (High = 
Conservative) 
-0.45 -0.40 0.45 0.48 
Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Whites 
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 Table OG10. 2012 CFA Results    
 Democratic Dimension Republican Dimension 
 Fixed Loadings on 
Measurement 
Free Loadings on 
Measurement 
Fixed Loadings on 
Measurement 
Free Loadings 
on 
Measurement 
Liberals 0.58 0.54   
Unions 0.40 0.37   
Blacks 0.26 0.41   
Hispanics 0.28 0.44   
Ppl. On Welfare 0.36 0.40   
Poor 0.09 0.17   
Asians 0.25 0.43   
Homosexuals 0.49 0.51   
Illegal Immigrants 0.39 0.45   
Feminists 0.45 0.45   
Muslims 0.50 0.55   
Atheists 0.41 0.41   
Conservatives   0.68 0.73 
Whites   0.01 0.12 
Big Business   0.43 0.50 
Military   0.08 0.16 
Christian 
Fundamentalists 
  0.41 0.48 
Christians   0.23 0.35 
Catholics   0.23 0.34 
Working Class   -0.16 -0.03 
Rich   0.36 0.45 
Mormons   0.35 0.43 
Tea Party   0.62 0.64 
     
Fit Statistics Fixed Free   
RMSEA 0.11 0.10   
CFI 0.597 0.692   
Χ2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000   
Χ2/df 26.27 22.13   
Stand. Root Square 
Mean Residual 
0.131 0.077   
     
Correlations     
Dem Groups (Fixed) 1    
Dem (Free) 0.88 1   
Rep (Fixed) -0.41 -0.36 1  
Rep (Free) -0.41 -0.19 0.91 1 
Dem. Party 0.37 0.37 -0.39 -0.30 
Rep. Party -0.37 -0.27 0.48 0.48 
PID (High = Str. Rep) -0.42 -0.37 0.46 0.40 
Ideology (High = 
Conservative) 
-0.52 -0.42 0.51 0.50 
Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Middle Class 
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Table OG11. 2016 CFA Results    
 
 
 
Democratic Dimension Republican Dimension 
 Fixed Loadings on 
Measurement 
Free Loadings on 
Measurement 
Fixed Loadings on 
Measurement 
Free Loadings 
on 
Measurement 
Liberals 0.68 0.75   
Feminists 0.61 0.68   
Unions 0.36 0.48   
Poor 0.07 0.21   
Gays & Lesbians 0.61 0.60   
Muslims 0.55 0.54   
Transgender 0.50 0.64   
Scientists 0.26 0.35   
Black Lives Matter 0.65 0.69   
Asians 0.13 -0.03   
Hispanics 0.19 0.03   
Blacks 0.19 0.07   
Illegal Immigrants 0.45 0.38   
Conservatives   0.69 0.76 
Christian 
Fundamentalists 
  0.63 0.69 
Big Business   0.47 0.55 
Rich   0.32 0.46 
Christians   0.45 0.57 
Tea Party   0.63 0.65 
Police   0.37 0.45 
     
Fit Statistics Fixed Free   
RMSEA 0.125 0.108   
CFI 0.662 0.774   
Χ2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000   
Χ2/df 17.65 13.31   
Stand. Root Square 
Mean Residual 
0.116 0.085   
     
Correlations     
Dem Groups (Fixed) 1    
Dem (Free) 0.93 1   
Rep (Fixed) -0.80 -0.62 1  
Rep (Free) -0.68 -0.44 0.88 1 
Dem. Party 0.59 0.60 -0.46 -0.34 
Rep. Party -0.49 -0.38 0.56 0.51 
PID (High = Str. Rep) -0.62 -0.58 0.57 0.47 
Ideology (High = 
Conservative) 
-0.72 -0.67 0.70 0.62 
Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Whites and Jews 
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Figure OG1: In-Group Ratings (Fixed Vs. Free) 
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Figure OG2: Out-Group Ratings (Fixed vs. Free) 
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Figure OG3: Difference Scores (Fixed vs. Free) 
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Table OG1. Overview of Results From Original Models and Models with ‘Free Loadings’ on Measurement 
Dimension [Party Affective Polarization, 1992-1996 ANES Panel] 
   
 Original ”Free Loading” Modles 
Cross-Lag Coefficient   
T1 SGP -> T2 Party 0.161** 
(0.0417) 
0.148** 
(0.0394) 
   
T2 SGP -> T3 Party 0.251** 
(0.0659) 
0.255** 
(0.0652) 
   
T1 Party -> T2 SGP 0.0504+ 
(0.0290) 
0.0567+ 
(0.0293) 
   
T2 Party -> T3 SGP  0.118* 
(0.0490) 
0.147** 
(0.0484) 
   
   
N =  425 425 
   
Wald Tests   
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 -> 
(SGPt2) 
p < 0.05 p < 0.10 
   
(SGPt2 -> Partyt3) = (Partyt2 -> 
(SGPt3) 
p = 0.119 p = 0.200 
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Table OG2. Overview of Results From Original Models and Models with ‘Free Loadings’ on Measurement 
Dimension  [PID Strength, 1992-1996 ANES Panel] 
   
 Original ”Free Loading” Models 
Cross-Lag Coefficient   
T1 SGP -> T2 Party 0.212* 
(0.0833) 
0.201* 
(0.0789) 
   
T2 SGP -> T3 Party 0.195* 
(0.0908) 
0.197* 
(0.0909) 
   
T1 Party -> T2 SGP 0.00394 
(0.0113) 
0.00597 
(0.0115) 
   
T2 Party -> T3 SGP  0.0273 
(0.0206) 
0.0315 
(0.0206) 
 
 
   
   
N =  425 425 
   
Wald Tests   
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 -> 
(SGPt2) 
p < 0.10 p < 0.10 
   
(SGPt2 -> Partyt3) = (Partyt2 -> 
(SGPt3) 
p < 0.05 p < 0.05 
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Table OG3. Overview of Results From Original Models and Models with ‘Free Loadings’ on Measurement 
Dimension [Party/Ideological Sorting, 1992-1996 ANES Panel] 
 
   
 Original Excluding Racial Groups 
Cross-Lag Coefficient   
T1 SGP -> T2 Party 0.378** 
(0.0677) 
0.353** 
(0.0641) 
   
T2 SGP -> T3 Party 0.309** 
(0.0730) 
0.276** 
(0.0731) 
   
T1 Party -> T2 SGP 0.0847** 
(0.0225) 
0.0703** 
(0.0229) 
   
T2 Party -> T3 SGP  0.100** 
(0.0283) 
0.115** 
(0.0280) 
   
   
N =  425 425 
   
Wald Tests   
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 -> 
(SGPt2) 
p < 0.01 p < 0.05 
   
(SGPt2 -> Partyt3) = (Partyt2 -> 
(SGPt3) 
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
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Table OG4. Overview of Results From Original Models and Models with ‘Free Loadings’ on Measurement 
Dimension [PID Strength, 2000-2004 ANES Panel] 
   
 Original ”Free Loading” Models 
Cross-Lag Coefficient   
T1 SGP -> T2 Party 0.0795 
(0.0715) 
0.0785 
(0.0717) 
   
T2 SGP -> T3 Party 0.124* 
(0.0616) 
0.125* 
(0.0604) 
   
T1 Party -> T2 SGP 0.0343** 
(0.0115) 
0.0353** 
(0.0118) 
   
T2 Party -> T3 SGP  -0.00602 
(0.0184) 
-0.000865 
(0.0182) 
   
N =  621 621 
   
Wald Tests   
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 -> 
(SGPt2) 
p = 0.53 p = 0.55 
   
(SGPt2 -> Partyt3) = (Partyt2 -> 
(SGPt3) 
p < 0.05 p = < 0.05 
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Table OG5. Overview of Results From Original Models and Models with ‘Free’ Loadings on Measurement 
Dimension [Sorting, 2000-2002 ANES Panel] 
 
 
 
 Original  
Cross-Lag Coefficient   
T1 SGP -> T2 Party 0.280** 
(0.0575) 
0.280** 
(0.0580) 
   
T1 Party -> T2 SGP 0.117** 
(0.0159) 
0.119** 
(0.0163) 
   
N =  831 831 
   
Wald Tests   
(SGPt1 -> Partyt2) = (Partyt1 -> 
(SGPt2) 
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
   
 
 
 
